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INTRODUCTION

Public housing has come to symbolize the complex web of
seemingly intractable problems facing urban America at the end of
the twentieth century. Even though public housing remains viable and
indeed coveted in some places, all too much of it fits the public image
of the program - of violent, drug-infested, partially abandoned,
large scale high-rise concentrations in the inner cities of major metropolitan areas. The dilemmas of persistent poverty and racism seem
to come together in these dangerous and deteriorating places that once
offered hope for those passing through them. Now they testify to the
country's failure to address its fundamental problems.
At the same time, advocates of change from various points on
the political spectrum use the state of public housing and the inner
city as support for their proposed policies and programs. Proponents
of privatization point to the public housing program as evidence of
government's inherent incapacities, and the need to turn to the private
market to provide services and address social problems, including
housing for low-income people.
Advocates of "choice" initiatives - both in housing and schools
break into two camps. Some stress the market, like their privatization colleagues, as a way of making more opportunities available,
including those for poor people. Others believe that even governmental
structures would be more responsive if their consumers had a greater
chance to select their facilities and services.
Supporters of metropolitan solutions to urban problems point to
public housing as exemplifying the concentration of poor people in
inner cities, and argue that policies and programs should facilitate
their moving to the suburbs. Similarly, integrationists see concentrations of racial minorities, mostly Blacks, in public housing, and press
for housing integration initiatives.
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Of course, there are many combinations and permutations of
these positions and other sides to each of them, as well. Some do not
trust the private market to respond to the needs of poor people and
racial minorities. Others argue that choice strategies redound to the
benefit of the middle-class and only make matters worse for poor
people, who are disproportionately minority. Many emphasize empowerment strategies and rebuilding poor and minority communities,
using unrecognized and untapped capacities of people there, including
public housing residents.
In 1966, while policy-makers, activists, and scholars debated these
questions, a woman named Dorothy Gautreaux, a tenant activist in
public housing in Chicago, agreed to let her name be used in two
class action lawsuits challenging racial policies and practices of the
Chicago Housing Authority and the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, respectively. Without knowing
where such a lawsuit might lead, she took the risk of personal
retribution that publicly resisting her "landlord" could entail. Dorothy Gautreaux's untimely death prevented her from witnessing even
the initial decision in the case. It is not clear how she would have
viewed the remedial measures adopted; but her courage in confronting
the institutions that broke the promise of decent housing was evident.
The case that bears Dorothy Gautreaux's name continued more
than a quarter of a century later. In the process, it provided an
oppoirtunity to test some of the approaches advanced to address the
problems of race and poverty.
In the first Gautreaux case, decided in 1969, the federal district
court found that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) had discriminated in selecting sites for public housing and assigning tenants on a
racially segregated basis. The court ordered CHA to provide additional
public housing, on a small-scale, "scattered site" basis, primarily in
predominantly white areas of the city.' That remedy was still proceeding, albeit with "all deliberate speed" and with several court-ordered
modifications, more than two decades later.
In the meantime, the other Gautreaux case, which was against
HUD - the federal agency that funded CHA's discriminatory program - moved along a separate and distinct track. In 1976, the
Supreme Court decided the HUD case, the first major Supreme Court
decision addressing racial discrimination in public housing.
The HUD case then began its own remedial saga, which contrasted sharply with CHA's. Instead of focusing on building and
1. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I11.
1969), enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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rehabilitating public housing in Chicago, the HUD remedy was a
metropolitan-wide initiative that facilitated plaintiff class families
moving into existing and newly constructed private rental housing
throughout the six-county region. It emphasized relocating families in
predominantly white areas of the suburbs.
Fifteen years later, about 4,500 public housing-eligible families
had entered the private rental market through the HUD remedy,
called the Gautreaux program. More than half of these families moved
to the suburbs, mostly to predominantly white middle-class communities. That was more than four times the approximately 1,000 families
housed in over 20 years through the remedy in the CHA case CHA's "scattered site" program of construction and rehabilitation
of small apartment buildings within the city. Yet the Gautreaux
program itself was modest in scale, especially compared to the more
2
than 40,000 plaintiff class families entitled to relief in the case.
The Gautreaux program's experience provides a case study of
both the potential and the limitations of this metropolitan, marketoriented integration strategy.' The program is the largest and longestrunning housing integration initiative in the history of the country.
Because of its focus on families moving to predominantly white
middle-class suburbs, the Gautreaux program also involved the rare
combination of economic and racial integration.
This article examines the opportunities, as well as the constraints,
encountered in this experiment in metropolitanization and privatization as an approach to providing housing for low-income Black
families. The combination of extending the program throughout the
region and using the private housing market - both existing housing
and new construction - expanded opportunities for racial and economic integration. ,Yet this approach encountered significant constraints that limited the scale of the program.
In spite of some initial uncertainty about whether low-income
Blacks would be willing to move to predominantly white communities
2. The Gautreaux program began as a one-year experiment, by agreement of
the parties, with a goal of assisting 400 families to move during that year. By the
end of the year, approximately 170 families had moved. Leonard S. Rubinowitz &
Katie Kenny, Report on the Gautreaux Demonstration Program Year I 5 (1978)
(unpublished, on file with author at Northwestern University School of Law). After
the parties continued the program informally for several more years, the district
court institutionalized it through a consent decree in 1981. HUD agreed to provide
funding for 7,100 families. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 674 (N.D. Ill.
1981). A decade later, the program had not reached the 7,100 total.
3. As with case studies generally, caution is appropriate in considering the
generalizability of the experience.
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a long distance from where they lived, families' interest in the
Gautreaux program burgeoned and remained at a high level. The
opportunity to move out of deteriorating communities and to secure
rent subsidies attracted large numbers of plaintiff class families.
However, even with the six-county region's housing market theoretically available, there were serious constraints on the supply side.
Program administrators and families worked diligently and creatively
to gain access to rental housing, particularly in predominantly white
middle-class suburbs. Their efforts produced a steady, but modest
supply of housing for the program; but the private market did not
respond in a way that came close to meeting the demand.
Thus, using the region's private housing market to achieve racial
and economic integration provided opportunities previously unavailable for assisting low-income Black families from public housing; but
substantial constraints arose from the same source. The private market's supply of housing for the program remained the limiting factor.
It was likely to continue to be the major constraint as long as the
program emphasized low-income Black families moving to predominantly white, middle-class communities.
This article begins with a brief discussion of the CHA case the violation, the remedy, and the severe implementation problems to provide background on the litigation and a basis of comparison
with the HUD case and the Gautreaux program. It then turns to the
HUD case, including the dialogue between the lower courts about the
violation and remedy, the landmark Supreme Court opinion in 1976,
and the development of the Gautreaux program after the Court's
decision. The main focus of the article is on the implementation of
the Gautreaux program - the opportunities and constraints that
characterized its first decade and a half. That discussion demonstrates
why families' interest in the program grew and sustained itself at a
high level, and why the supply of housing available to those families
did not. The conclusion considers future prospects for such initiatives,
based on the Chicago experience.

II.

THE

CHA

CASE

The immediate origins of the Gautreaux case lay in the post-War
boom in the construction of public housing in Chicago and other
cities. 4 In the Housing Act of 1949, Congress substantially increased

4. DEVEREUX BOWLY, JR., THE POORHOUSE: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN CHICAGO,
1895-1976 (1978); MARTIN MEYERSON AND EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING
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the funding for the public housing program that it had created more
than a decade earlier, in the depths of the Great Depression.' The
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) carried out a major expansion of
its program in the 1950's and early 1960's by building a number of
large scale, high-rise developments. 6 In 1966, a CHA tenant named
Dorothy Gautreaux leant her name to a class action lawsuit claiming
that CHA administered its program on a racially segregated basis.
The plaintiffs also sued the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) for funding and approving the discriminatory
7
aspects of Chicago's program.
No state or local law in Chicago required or explicitly permitted
operation of the public housing program on a racially segregated
basis. Nor did the CHA adopt a formal policy of segregation. The
legal structure of segregation that pervaded school systems and other
aspects of public life in the South during that period, and was struck
down in Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent cases, was
not present in the Gautreaux case. Instead, the Gautreaux plaintiffs
challenged CHA's informal, covert policies and practices that allegedly
had both the intent and effect of producing a racially segregated
public housing system in Chicago. At the time, the Supreme Court
had not ruled in any case involving this northern pattern - actions
by local officials in pursuit of segregation, without a formal mandate
in state or local law. 9
Although the district court had to operate in somewhat uncharted
territory, it concluded that CHA discriminated intentionally and
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO

(1955).

The earlier origins of the case date back to the segregation and other forms of

discrimination in housing against Blacks in the two great migrations of Blacks from
the South to Chicago and other northern cities. ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE
SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960 (1983). See also JAMES
R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE (1989); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND (1991);
ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920

(1967).

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (1987). See generally Lisa J. LaPlace, The Legality of
Integration Maintaining Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced Housing?, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 197, 205 (1989).
6. BoWLY, supra note 4; HIRSCH, supra note 4; MEYERSON

AND

BANFIELD,

supra note 4.
7. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
8. Brown v. Board. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
9. The Supreme Court first ventured into that territory in the Denver school
case, which it decided several years after the district court in Chicago ruled on CHA's
actions. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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systematically both in selecting sites for public housing and in assigning tenants to developments.' 0 CHA built most of its public housing
in Black neighborhoods. Moreover, it used racially segregated waiting
lists, and assigned mostly white tenants to the few developments in
white areas."
The court's remedial order left the existing public housing relatively intact, and focused on requiring the CHA to provide additional
housing on a desegregated basis.' 2 The court defined desegregation by
specifying two types of areas based on their racial composition and
mandating proportions of remedial housing to be located within each
of them. The "limited area" was those census tracts with thirty
3
percent or more Black populations, or within a mile of such areas.'
The remainder was the "general area." The first 700 public housing
units were to be located in the "general area." After that, three out
of four apartments were to be in those predominantly white areas. '4
In addition, the court required that the housing be provided on
a "scattered site" basis. Instead of the concentrations of high-rise
complexes that characterized much CHA housing, the remedial housing was to be low-rise, small buildings, located on a variety of sites
rather than clustered."' The "scattered site" program was to include
both new construction and small, privately owned apartment buildings
that CHA would purchase, rehabilitate, and own.
The "scattered site" remedy applied primarily to Chicago, where
the violation took place, and the plaintiffs lived. However, the court
recognized that state law gave CHA the authority to. operate outside
of the city, under specified circumstances, including the agreement of
relevant suburban public officials. 6 Consequently, the court gave
CHA the option of providing up to one-third of the housing that was

1969).

10. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.

11. Id.
12. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, enforcing 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
13. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
14. Id. at 738.
15. Id.at 739.
16. Under Illinois law, housing authorities may operate within the city and
within three miles beyond the city boundaries, in unincorporated areas. In addition,

a housing authority may operate elsewhere by contract with another housing authority
or with a state public body not within the operation of another housing authority.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, paras. 17(b), 27(c) (1989).
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to go into predominantly white areas in such areas in suburban Cook
7
County.1
Implementation of the "scattered site" program was virtually
non-existent for the next five years. 8 No public housing was built in
Chicago during that period. After that, the program proceeded at an
extraordinarily slow pace. The obstacles to implementation were
numerous and varied. First, local officials, including the CHA itself,
the mayor, and the Chicago City Council opposed the program. They
used a variety of means to thwart it, including refusals to identify
potential sites for public housing or provide necessary approvals for
sites that were proposed. Each of these actions - or inactions necessitated returns to the district court for additional orders, with
the inevitable delays involved in hearings and appeals.
In addition to the resistance from public officials, private citizens
worked to frustrate implementation. When proposed sites were announced, they lobbied their city council representatives to block them.
Also, private builders sometimes purchased proposed sites before
CHA gained control of them, and developed them, thus precluding
their use for public housing.
A decade after the initial order, the locational formula was
changed by agreement of the parties. 9 They eliminated the requirement of the first 700 units going in the "general area," and substituted
a one-to-one ratio for the requirement that three-fourths of the
apartments go in those areas. This modification reflected both the
difficulty of implementing the program in predominantly white areas
and the need for additional low-income housing in the Black community. Even with these changes, however, public and private opposition continued to stall the program.
In 1984, with the beginning of the Harold Washington administration, there was finally local political support for the "scattered
site" program. However, CHA's inability to administer the program
competently continued to hamper it. Finally, in 1987, the district
court, out of frustration with the excruciatingly slow pace of relief,
acceded to plaintiffs' counsel's third request for the appointment of
a receiver to administer the scattered site program and appointed a
private developer to implement the new construction and rehabilitation
17. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. at 739.
18. This account of the implementation process draws heavily on Leonard S.
Rubinowitz, Development of Chicago's Housing Assistance Plan (1976) (unpublished,
on file with author).
19. Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux & Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 451, 460 (1988).

1992:5891

THE GA UTREA UX PROGRAM

elements of the program. Although the receiver accelerated the pace
of both new construction and rehabilitation somewhat, HUD and
CHA procedural requirements prevented any substantial growth in
the program.
The first two decades after the initial court order demonstrated
that fulfilling the court's goals was an extraordinarily difficult task.
Fewer than 1,000 apartments for the plaintiff class were provided
during that time period - both through new construction and rehabilitation. This was an average of less than 50 apartments per year,
as compared to the rate of construction in the 1950's and early 1960's
of over a thousand apartments a year. 20
III.

THE OTHER GAUTREAUX CASE:

HUD

AND METROPOLITAN

RELIEF

The companion case against HUD took quite a different course
from the CHA case. While the CHA litigation proceeded to a decision
on liability and the court's adoption of a remedy, the court stayed
the HUD case. 2' When the plaintiffs sought to revitalize it in the early
1970's, the district court's posture was quite different than it had
been in the CHA case - both on questions of liability and remedy.
However, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court had a broader
view of the role HUD played in CHA's discriminatory history, and
its potential remedial responsibilities.
A.

THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT: VIOLATION AND REMEDY

The HUD case went back and forth between the district court
and the court of appeals before it reached the Supreme Court. The
lower court dialogue operated on several levels. Both at the violation
and remedial stages, these courts considered separation of powers
questions - the extent to which federal courts should intervene in
the administration of a federal agency's functions. But for present
purposes, the more significant encounters were between contrasting
conceptions of the nature and causes of, and solutions to, problems
of race, poverty, and housing in American cities.
20. See generally Id. at 452, 459-60. All of the apartments were located in the
city, because suburban officials had rejected CHA's requests to build public housing
beyond the city limits. Although the majority of these buildings were in predominantly
white areas, a portion of this housing was in predominantly Black areas, pursuant to
the racial formulas the court had adopted. For previous rate, see BoWLY, supra note
4, at 111-12.
21. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 287 (1976); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448

F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
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The federal courts' decisions highlighted the tension between the
goals of providing as much housing as possible for low-income people
and bringing about racial integration through publicly funded housing
programs. Although those objectives may be compatible in theory,
the urban historical, political, and social context suggests the difficulty
of reconciling them, in practice. Also implicit in the courts' debate is
a clash between individualistic and communitarian conceptions, between ideologies and policies based on protecting individual rights,
and those valuing and attending to the collective concerns of lowincome Black urban communities.
The courts also struggled with the closely related question of
whether central cities and their suburban rings are to be considered
separable in addressing entrenched problems of race and poverty. One
approach conceives of political boundaries as social boundaries that city limits define and confine the problem, and therefore they
constrain the solutions - at least the judicially imposed ones geographically. A competing conception views metropolitan areas as
integrally inter-related - that fundamental problems and solutions
play themselves out on a regional canvas, so courts must do so, as
well.
In addition to its theoretical implications, the dialogue between
the district court and the court of appeals foreshadowed the feasibility
questions that emerged at the implementation stage of the HUD case.
Thus, their struggle with the issues of whether and where there was
to be a federally initiated remedy serves as a useful introduction to a
consideration of the possibilities for implementing such relief.
The district court found that HUD was not liable for CHA's
discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment practices.2 2 The
opinion portrayed the federal agency as facing a dilemma. It tried
vigorously, but unsuccessfully, to get CHA to operate on a nondiscriminatory basis. Failing to accomplish that purpose, the agency
had to continue funding the discriminatory program or deprive lowincome families of much needed housing. HUD opted for the former,
and the court found that decision to be within the agency's discretion.23

The court of appeals reversed, citing the extensive federal role
not only in funding CHA's program, but in approving the discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment policies and practices.24
22. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. II1. 1973).
23. Id.
24. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d at 739-40.
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The court found HUD liable because it was fully implicated in the
local agency's conduct, and remanded the case to the district court
for determination of appropriate relief.2"
At the remedial stage, plaintiffs' counsel proposed that the court

order HUD to provide metropolitan-wide relief rather than limiting

the remedy to the City of Chicago.2 6 HUD, on the other hand,
proposed an order that would require it to use its "best efforts" to
assist CHA in providing relief within the city.27 Plaintiffs' counsel
argued that it was necessary to reach out into the suburbs to provide
relief for the more than 40,000 plaintiff class families, and the district
court had the power to do so because the plaintiffs were entitled to
full relief.38 Moreover, a metropolitan-wide approach would have
educational, employment and other benefits for class members. 29
The district judge was not moved by these arguments, finding
that any relief beyond the City of Chicago would be "improper"

because the violafion took place within the city and the plaintiff class
members were all city residents.30 Since the judge ruled on a motion
asking him to consider metropolitan-wide relief, his decision addressed
the abstract principle rather than any specific proposed metropolitan

plan. 3
Once again, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the district court's remedial power was not limited to the

25. Note that the Seventh Circuit suggested that deference was appropriate,
and a simple "best efforts" order might suffice. It was ironic that the Seventh Circuit
took a different stand when the district court's remedial order reached the court of
appeals. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d at 740-41; Gautreaux v. Romney 363 F.
1973).
Supp. 690 (N.D. I11.
26. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. at 690-91.
27. This proposal was consistent with the July 1969 order to CHA to use its
"best efforts" to increase public housing opportunities as rapidly as possible. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 290 n.8 (1976).
28. Memoranda in Support of Plaintiffs' Outline of Proposed Final Order
Embodying Comprehensive Plan for Relief; Memorandum #2 - The Additional
Dwelling Units to be Provided Should be Located Throughout a Defined Metropolitan
Area (July 3, 1972).
29. Id.
30. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. at 691. Judge Austin strenuously
objected to considering "a metropolitan plan for relief against political entities which
have previously had nothing to do with this lawsuit." Id.
31. However, parts of Judge Austin's opinion also suggested a ruling on the
merits of the proposed metropolitan remedy. For example, Judge Austin stated that
"[tihe factual basis for [the plaintiffs'] request is an opinion of an urbanologist that
by the year 2000 the entire geographic area of the City of Chicago will be within the
limited public housing area . . . ." Id. Judge Austin found such a basis insufficient
to impose relief extending beyond the city limits. Id.
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City of Chicago.3 2 After a rehearing, the court of appeals again
concluded that metropolitan-wide relief was permissible, and remanded the case, with a somewhat ambiguous mandate, to the district
court "for additional evidence and for further consideration of the
issue of metropolitan area relief. .... ,,3
While the district court's refusal to consider metropolitan-wide
relief was on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
the appropriate geographical scope of relief in a school desegregation
case. Two years before the Gautreaux case reached the Supreme
Court, the Court decided Milliken v. Bradley, involving a proposed
metropolitan-wide remedy for school segregation in the Detroit public
schools. The lower courts concluded that both local and state officials
had discriminated, against Black children in the Detroit schools. 3 4 They
had also determined that an inter-district remedy that included suburban districts was necessary to desegregate the predominantly Black
5
Detroit schools.
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' decisions on the scope of the remedy. Desegregation measures
could not extend beyond the central city, because the violation of the
Black children's rights and the effects of that violation were limited
to the City of Detroit.36 Proof of an "interdistrict violation or effect"
was necessary to enable the court to adopt an order requiring suburban
school districts to participate in the remedy." Otherwise, an interdistrict remedy would violate the Court's limitation on the judicial power,
that the "scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the violation." ' 3 Although the Court's opinion did not preclude
the possibility of metropolitan-wide remedies in school desegregation
cases, it rejected that approach in this case, and imposed a heavy
burden of justification for district courts contemplating interdistrict
remedies in school desegregation cases.3 9
1974).

32. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 934-36 (7th Cir.

33. Id. at 940.
34. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bradley v.
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
35. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 592-93; Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d
at 242. The lower courts had not adopted a specific remedy, but they had determined
that the decree would encompass 53 suburban school districts in addition to the
Detroit public schools.
36. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974).
37. Id. at 744-45.
38. Id. at 744 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 16 (1971)).
39. Several lower courts adopted inter-district school desegregation remedies

1992:5891

THE GA UTREA UX PROGRAM

The Seventh Circuit in Gautreaux attempted to distinguish the
public housing situation, in general, and the Chicago facts, in particular, from the Detroit school desegregation situation in Milliken. 40 It
cited evidence of racially segregated public housing patterns in suburban Cook County, and it also concluded that CHA's practices may
have triggered "white flight" and the resulting segregation. 4'
B.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

As the ultimate legal arbiter in the case, the Supreme Court's
decision established the remedial parameters. It not only determined
the permissible geographical scope of relief; but it also provided
instructions to the district court that defined and limited the forms
the remedy could take. In so doing, the Court provided both opportunities - the possibility of implementing relief on a metropolitanwide basis, using recently enacted housing subsidy programs that
relied heavily on the private market - and constraints -

the protec-

tion of federal and local autonomy in ways that could significantly
limit the effectiveness of the relief.
At the same time, the Court addressed only generally and briefly
the meaning of "desegregation" - the racial aspect of relief. It left
open questions such as the extent to which plaintiff class families
could receive subsidies to live wherever they wanted, regardless of the
racial composition of the area, or whether the remedy would be
designed to produce racial integration, through low-income Black
families moving into predominantly white areas. The subsequent
resolution of those questions, which the Supreme Court left in the
after the Milliken v. Bradley decision, after concluding that an inter-district violation
or effect had been demonstrated. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board. of Educ.,
510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Evans v. Buchanan,
555 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Liddell v. Missouri,
731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Leggett v. Liddell, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
The Supreme Court did not review any of these cases, thus letting the lower courts'
inter-district remedies stand.
40. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 934-36 (7th Cir.
1974). The appellate court clearly held that local political subdivisions did not

foreclose the district court's remedial power. In fact, the court stated that until

Milliken v. Bradley, "the law was clear that political subdivisions of the states may
be readily bridged when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights." 503
F.2d at 934. The court also stated that Milliken did not change this principle, but
instead only established an equitable limitation of remedies, based on practicality
concerns of imposing inter-district remedies. Id. at 935-36. Thus, the court saw its
task as deciding what degree of housing desegregation was practical. Id. at 936.
41. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d at 938-39.
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hands of the lower courts and the parties, had a crucial impact on
the implementation possibilities.
The Supreme Court decided Gautreaux against the backdrop of
the Milliken case. The Court's legal analysis focused almost exclusively
on Milliken. 42 The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's Gautreaux
findings of interdistrict segregation and effects that would have put
the case squarely within Milliken's conditions for permitting areawide
relief. Nevertheless, the Court unanimously affirmed the appellate
court's conclusion that, unlike in Milliken, the district court had the
43
authority to adopt a metropolitan-wide housing remedy.
The Court linked permitting metropolitan relief and the privatization of federal housing programs. In the Court's scenarios, the
possibilities of designing and implementing relief beyond the City of
Chicago depended largely on utilizing the private housing market especially new construction - through a rent subsidy program Congress enacted in 1974." The Court also gave general guidance but no
precise indication about what racial desegregation might mean in a
metropolitan context. It noted that HUD operated under several Civil
Rights and related statutes, and that the agency's compliance with its
own legal mandates would ensure consistency with any racial requirements that the district court might impose.
At the same time that it considered the practical possibilities for
metropolitan relief, the Supreme Court did not mandate it. The Court
concluded only that the district court had the discretion to proceed in
this direction if it deemed it appropriate. 45 However, the Court's
discussion of these interrelated questions - the geographical scope of
relief, the privatization focus, and the meaning of desegregation was to have a crucial impact on what came after the Court's decision.
1. Metropolitan-wide Relief
The metropolitan question was the only one the Supreme Court
actually decided. And the Court concluded only that there could be
42. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-306 (1976). The Court's opinion
focused as much on the pragmatic question of operating housing programs on a
metropolitan-wide basis as on legal analysis. See infra pages 605-11.
43. The vote was 8-0. Justice Stevens had sat on the Seventh Circuit while the
Gautreaux case was pending, and did not participate in the Supreme Court's decision.
Justice Marshall, along with Justices Brennan and White - three of the four
dissenters in Milliken - concurred briefly to reiterate their disagreement with Milliken
as having unduly limited the courts' remedial powers in desegregation cases. Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 306-07.
44. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 303-05 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-18 (Supp.
IV 1970)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437s (Supp. IV 1970).

45. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 306.
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such relief, not that there should be. Since there was no specific order
before the Court, it did not need to decide on the appropriateness of
particular remedial arrangements, such as desegregation goals and
strategies, or the role of public and private entities in implementing
relief. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's opinion for a unanimous Court
discussed these matters and spelled out metropolitan remedial possibilities in some detail." He did so, presumably, in order to demonstrate the existence of metropolitan remedial options which would not
run afoul of the Milliken limitations.
In affirming the possibility of a metropolitan-wide remedy, the
Supreme Court reiterated that it had not established a per se rule in
Milliken, which would preclude relief from extending beyond the
geographical locale where the violation occurred. 47 The Court focused
on two distinctions from the school desegregation context. First, HUD
was the defendant in this branch of Gautreaux, and the agency's own
definition of the appropriate geographical area for the operation of
its programs recognized that "[t]he relevant geographic area for
purposes of the respondents' housing options is the Chicago housing
market, not the Chicago city limits."" HUD had developed the
concept of a "housing market area" as the geographic area within
which housing units are in competition with each other for homeseekers . The point of reference for housing market areas was the private
housing market, so these areas extended beyond central cities into the
46. See supra note 27; Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 301-06.
47. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 292-93, 296.
48. Id. at 299. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Roger J. Dennis, School Deseg-

regation Versus Public Housing Desegregation: The Local School District and the
Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URB. L. ANN. 145 (1975), for an extended
discussion of the ways in which HUD administered its programs on an areawide or
metropolitan basis.
In Milliken, the plaintiffs had established state liability. Although the State of
Michigan's educational programs are not limited by the boundaries of Detroit, the
Court did not accept the state's involvement as a basis for permitting relief beyond
the city limits. The Court noted instead that local school districts constituted the
traditional administrative units for carrying out school programs, and that the state
of Michigan respected those boundaries. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742-47
(1974).
The Court also noted that CHA had statutory authority to operate outside of
the city, so its jurisdiction was not limited to Chicago. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
at 298. The district court had made the same point in its 1969 order. Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I11.
1969). The Supreme Court
did not pursue this point, presumably because HUD was the relevant defendant for
this aspect of the case. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298-99.
49. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299.
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suburbs where households also searched for housing. 50 Chicago's
housing market area encompassed the six-county metropolitan area.
So the court could order HUD to implement its programs to provide
relief throughout that area.
More importantly, the Court concluded that it was possible to
design a remedial order encompassing the suburbs that did not exceed
the limitations the Court had articulated in Milliken. HUD had argued
that any metropolitan housing remedy would violate Milliken's strictures and exceed the district court's power. 5 The Court concluded
instead that it was feasible to design remedies against HUD that did
not interfere with the powers of suburban local governments and
2
housing authorities that had not been implicated in any wrongdoing .
So a metropolitan-wide remedy would be consistent with the Supreme
Court's previously established principle that remedies could not extend
beyond the violation.53
In support of its conclusion, the Court discussed ways an order
would need to be limited to avoid intruding impermissibly on the
powers of suburban governmental entities. The legal authority of
suburban governments and public housing agencies to control housing
development remained intact . 4 For example, under the traditional
public housing program, the initiative rested with local officials to
apply for federal funds. So the trial court could not require suburban
officials to initiate public housing proposals that would accommodate
Chicago residents."
Moreover, local zoning and other land use controls would not be
affected by any metropolitan-wide remedy.5 6 As discussed below, the
Court focused on construction of subsidized housing by private
developers as a likely remedial vehicle. 7 Those developers would be
subject to the usual local regulations. In short, the possibility of
50. Id.

51. HUD claimed at oral argument "that court-ordered metropolitan relief in
this case, no matter how gently it's gone about, no matter how it's framed, is bound
to require HUD to ignore the safeguards of local autonomy and local political
processes .... " Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300. Much of the subsequent
discussion in the opinion was designed to demonstrate that sufficiently "gentle"
remedial possibilities existed that remained within the bounds of the judicial power.
52. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 301.
53. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
54. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 303.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 305; see discussion infra pp. 607-09.
57. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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shaping remedies that operated in the suburbs without coercing suburban officials was a crucial distinction from the Milliken scenario,
where the remedy seemed to the majority of the Court to be destined
to restructure dozens of suburban school districts against their will.58
Having concluded that it was legal for the remedy to extend
beyond the central city, the Court's opinion left it to the district court
to decide whether it was appropriate to do so in light of the facts of
the case.5 9 The Court did not discuss explicitly whether it was "necessary and appropriate" in this case to fashion a metropolitan-wide
remedy. It sent the case back to the district court to determine the
geographical scope and content of the relief.60 However, the Court
noted the extended difficulties the district court had encountered in
overseeing relief in Chicago - a possible hint that relief beyond the
city might be appropriate - as part of an effective remedy for the
plaintiff class. 61 Moreover, the Court's extended discussion of possible
metropolitan remedies indicated that the district court should give the
metropolitan option serious consideration.
2.

Privatization

In discussing the possibilities for metropolitan-wide relief, the
Supreme Court began with a consideration of the federal subsidized
housing programs that would be the remedial vehicles.6 2 It discussed
briefly the potential role of public housing, the program in which the
violation had taken place; but the Court emphasized the important
changes that had taken place in federal housing programs since the
Gautreaux case had been decided in 1969. Congress had enacted the
Section 8 rent subsidy program in 1974, and it had reallocated funds
dramatically away from the traditional public housing program im63
plicated in Gautreaux, and into the Section 8 program.

75).

58. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296 (discussing Milliken, 418 U.S. at 77159. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 289 n.8.
The appellate court's determination that a remedy extending beyond the city

limits was both "necessary and equitable" rested in part on the agreement

of the parties and the expert witnesses that "the metropolitan area is a

single relevant locality for low rent housing purposes and that a city only
remedy will not work."

Id. at 292 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 936-37
(7th Cir. 1974) (also discussing "white flight")).
62. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 303.
63. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1978).
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The Section 8 program was a move toward privatization of federal
housing subsidies. It provided rent subsidies for lower-income families
to live in private housing." Owners of newly constructed, rehabilitated, or existing housing received monthly payments on behalf of
lower-income tenants. 65 Federal rent subsidies paid the difference
between the market rent for the apartments and a specified percentage
of tenants' income.6
The Supreme Court's opinion envisioned Section 8 - particularly
the new construction component - as the central vehicle for any
suburban initiatives the district court might undertake. 67 The Court
observed that the Section 8 program both enlarged HUD's role in
"the creation of housing opportunities" and "largely replaced the
older federal low-income housing programs. "68 Consequently, Section
8 became the focal point of the Court's discussion.
The Court's discussion of hypothetical Section 8 remedies dealt
almost exclusively with new construction. 69 The opinion scarcely mentioned the rehabilitation and existing housing components of the
program. The Court was not explicit about why it examined only one
aspect of the program, to the exclusion of the other two, especially
in light of its view that the Section 8 program was the key to any
possible metropolitan relief. One possibility is the Court continued
the theme of the original remedy in the CHA case - the scattered
site program, which featured new construction, particularly at the
outset.70

The opinion's emphasis on distinguishing Milliken provides another possible explanation for this single focus, while also raising
additional questions about the lack of attention to Section 8's existing
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1978).

65. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1978).

66. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) provides that the monthly assistance payment is the
difference between the maximum monthly rental provided for in the contract and the
rent the family must pay under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(2). 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a) states
that a family will pay the greater of: (1) 30 percent of the family's monthly adjusted
income, (2) 10 percent of the family's monthly income, or (3) the portion of other
welfare assistance designated to meet the family's housing costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)
(Supp. 1991).
67. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 303.
68. Id.
69. Sometimes, the Court's focus was explicitly on new construction. Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 304. At other points in the opinion, new construction is
clearly assumed. Id.
70. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. 111.

1969).

1992:5891

THE GA UTREA UX PROGRAM

housing element. On the one hand, new construction posed the
greatest threat to the Milliken non-coercion requirement. New developments were subject to a whole panoply of local land use and other
regulations of residential construction. So new construction triggered
the most local government involvement and the greatest risk of
coercion of local entities in pursuit of relief. Focusing on new construction enabled the Court to indicate that localities would retain
their regulatory powers, thus demonstrating the possibility of relief
that would not cross the Milliken line of coercing suburban public
bodies not implicated in the violation.
On the other hand, if the Court's goal was to show the availability
of metropolitan remedies that could order actions by HUD and leave
local governments alone, developing hypothetical scenarios using Section 8's existing housing component would have been a more effective
way to make the point. The existing housing approach does not
necessitate involvement by local bodies. Local governments need not
approve the program, because the housing already exists and tenants
deal with private landlords. Public housing authorities may administer
the contracts with private housing owners if they choose to do so;
but the federal statute provides for HUD to carry out these responsibilities itself if a public housing authority does not wish to participate. 7' In short, the Section 8 existing housing program provided a
non-coercive remedial option that the Court overlooked.
The Court's willingness to permit metropolitan remedies, in
combination with its emphasis on private construction of Section 8
housing, made its discussion of local land use and other regulatory
controls particularly important. The discussion of local authority was
in the opinion, initially, because of the focus on metropolitan relief;
but it took on special significance because the Court's hypothetical
scenarios stressed Section 8 new construction. Although it was apparently dicta, since there need be no metropolitan relief whatsoever, the
Court stressed that a metropolitan order would not "displace the
rights and powers accorded local government entities under ...
existing land-use laws." 72 The Court's deference to local control meant
that suburban communities' exercise of their regulatory authority
could have a crucial impact on the implementation of the new
construction approach the Court envisioned.

71. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (Supp. 1991).
72. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1975). The Court also indicated
that local governments' powers under federal or state housing statutes would remain
unaffected.
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As in other metropolitan areas, many Chicago suburbs had
policies and practices characterized by critics and some state courts in
other parts of the country as "exclusionary zoning." 71 Under the
Supreme Court's guidelines, even if the district court extended relief
beyond the city limits, suburban communities apparently could continue to prohibit or limit apartment construction, specify minimum
lot sizes, or take other measures that could impede or prevent construction of Section 8 developments providing housing for the plaintiff
4

class .1

73. For discussions of exclusionary zoning and remedies, see Terry D. Morgan,
Exclusionary Zoning: Remedies Under Oregon's Land Use Planning Program, 14
ENVTL. L.J. 779 (1984); J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982
DUKE L.J. 761; Linda Wintner, An Argument for an Antitrust Attack on Exclusionary
Zoning, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 1035 (1984). For cases addressing exclusionary zoning,
see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975) (low and moderate income housing); Simmons v. Royal Oak, 196
N.W.2d 811 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (exclusion of multiple dwellings); Girsh Appeal,
263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970) (exclusion of multiple dwellings).
74. The import of the Court's discussion of land use controls is not entirely
clear, however. First, it is arguably dicta, since it concerns a hypothetical state of
affairs if the district court, on remand, determined that metropolitan relief was
appropriate in this case. Moreover, the Court did not preclude the possibility of a
specific and limited set-aside order in a particular instance where a local zoning
ordinance or administrative decision prevented the construction of housing proposed
as part of the remedy in the case. In fact, the Court referred in its opinion to a
similar set-aside order the district court had issued a few years earlier in the CHA
case, mandating that CHA proceed with development in spite of the lack of City
Council approval of proposals pursuant to its state statutory mandate. The district
court had set aside the operation of the state statute for purposes of this case only,
without considering its constitutionality, because its operation impeded constitutionally mandated relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court's Jenkins decision, in 1990, created still more uncertainty
about the possibility of a narrow set-aside of local regulatory authority in a postGautreaux remedy. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). In Jenkins, the Court
affirmed the set-aside of a presumptively constitutional state property tax ceiling in
order to permit a local school district to raise sufficient revenues to fund the
desegregation program the district court had ordered after finding the district guilty
of de jure segregation. In Jenkins, the defendant school district was to proceed as if
the state limit did not exist, just as in the earlier chapter of the Gautreaux saga, the
defendant CHA was to go ahead with construction without the state mandated City
Council approval. In a hypothetical metropolitan Section 8 scenario, a set-aside would
be on behalf of a private developer rather than the public housing agency, a distinction
that simply adds to the uncertainty about the implications of the Gautreaux Court's
deference to suburban governments.
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Desegregation

When the Supreme Court turned to the question of desegregation,
it followed the same approach it used in discussing the kinds of
housing programs that might be used for remedial purposes. It
illustrated, rather than mandated, possible directions the district court
might go. The Court turned to statutory and administrative provisions
relevant to site selection, as part of its effort to demonstrate that a
metropolitan remedy could proceed within the existing programmatic
and legal framework. 75 The Court concluded that from a desegregation
standpoint, a metropolitan-wide order could simply require HUD to
do what it was already authorized or required to do under relevant
civil rights statutes - Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 - and their implementing regulations. 76
The Fair Housing Act even required that HUD administer its programs
affirmatively to further fair housing.77 The Court was deferential to
the agency in suggesting that an order might simply require it to meet
its statutory obligations or to exercise its administrative discretion in
7
particular ways .

With its emphasis on new construction - particularly through
the Section 8 program - the Court's consideration of desegregation
75. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 301-05.
76. Id. at 301, 302; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1981); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968); 24
C.F.R. § 200.710 (1981). As the Court noted, Title VI, which prohibits racial
discrimination in federally funded programs, is the statute that the court of appeals
found HUD had violated. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 301 n.17.
42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1974). As the Court noted, the federal Fair Housing Act postdated the violations in the Gautreaux case; but it would guide HUD's actions in any
prospective relief in the case.
The Gautreaux case and other civil rights litigation had influenced HUD's
regulations in this regard. George Lefcoe, From Capitol Hill: The Impact of Civil

Rights Litigation on HUD Policy, 4 URn.LAW. 112, 114-16 (1972); David 0. Maxwell,
HUD's Project Selection Criteria - A Cure for "Impermissable Color Blindness?"
48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 92, 100-01 (1972).
77. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 302-03; 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968); see
Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American
Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs,

74 Nw. U. L. REV. 491 (1979), for an extended discussion of the ambiguities and
complexities in interpreting this "affirmative mandate."
78. Although the tone was deferential, HUD might well have viewed the
prospect of the court requiring it to exercise its discretion in some ways and not
others as particularly intrusive. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
why the parties negotiated rather than continuing to litigate, as the Supreme Court
envisioned).
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focused on site selection. The Court pointed to HUD regulations and
site selection criteria for new construction as sources of relevant policy
in this area.79 Those provisions emphasized funding developments that
would expand housing opportunities outside areas of minority concentration. 80 Significantly, the Court's broad brush approach to site

selection did not preclude the kind of, hybrid approach adopted in the
CHA case, which balanced integration and other goals by requiring
that some "remedial" housing developments go in largely white areas
and permitting others in predominantly Black areas."'
The Court did not discuss the locational implications of remedies

that used the Section 8 existing housing program, because its focus

was on new construction. Existing housing strategies provided an
opportunity for families to make locational decisions, rather than
2.
public or private developers.
The Court touched on one other locational matter, however. It
referred to the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, in
79. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 302; HUD Evaluation of Rent Supplement
Projects and Low-Rent Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 203 (1973).
80. Ironically, the Court emphasized regulations that applied to the traditional
public housing program, while its programmatic discussion focused on Section 8 as
having largely replaced public housing. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 302-05.
The Court did not interpret these provisions or discuss HUD's interpretation or
implementation of them, except to. refer to a study showing that the interpretations
varied among HUD field offices. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 302 n.18 (citing
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION OF HUD
PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: AN EVALUATION 116-18 (Dec.
1972)).
81. The Court had described, without comment, the original remedy, which
permitted part of the new construction to go into the "limited housing area." Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 288; See also supra pp. 595-96 (discussing the hybrid
approach in the original order and the court permitting more housing in predominantly Black areas in a subsequent order modifying the 1969 decree).
HUD regulations also did not preclude providing subsidized housing in predominantly Black neighborhoods, except under specified circumstances. Arguably, however, the regulations the Court cited are strongly integrationist and biased against
Black area construction, if taken literally; but the Court cited a study that found
HUD field offices varied substantially in interpreting and applying the regulations.
See 24 C.F.R. § 200-710 (1975). The Court also cited language in statutes and
regulations about "choice," an ambiguous term that could also suggest the possibility
of housing in predominantly Black areas.
See also infra pp. 613-15 (discussion of the consent decree). The district court's
opinion noted that the court had never precluded providing housing in Black areas
as part of the relief in the case.
82. See infra pp. 616-17. For a discussion of alternative interpretations of the
Fair Housing Act's "affirmative mandate," as applied to existing housing, see
Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 77, at 533-65.
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which Congress sought to promote greater choice of housing opportunities for lower-income people and to "avoid undue concentration
of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of lowerincome persons. ' 83 Although the Gautreaux claims had always been
about racial discrimination, in citing the 1974 statute, the Court
implicitly recognized that the case had economic class implications as
well as racial ones because the plaintiff class consisted entirely of lowincome families. 4 Economic integration emerged as an increasingly
important aspect of the remedy after the Supreme Court's decision.
In light of the demographics of suburbia, metropolitan-wide racial
desegregation would also lead to economic integration. The Supreme
Court's reference to the 1974 Act foreshadowed that eventuality.8 5
With its remand, the Supreme Court left the district judge with
a good deal of discretion - not only on the threshold question about
whether there was to be a metropolitan-wide remedy, but also on
what the content of any remedy adopted the court. At the same time,
the Court placed significant limitations on the district court's remedial
powers.8 6 Its remedial framework established the initial opportunities
and constraints that would ultimately affect the implementation of
relief.
C.

NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT: THE INVENTION AND EVOLUTION
OF THE GAUTREAUX PROGRAM

Supreme Court decisions are often both endings and beginnings.
The Court's 1976 Gautreaux decision concluded a legal struggle to
determine whether the remedy could extend beyond the borders of
the City of Chicago. In answering in the affirmative, the Court's
decision planted a seed that developed into a housing program for
low-income Black families to move throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.
However, the remedial program did not come about according
to the Supreme Court's script - a remand for additional hearings,
leading to the district court's determination about the scope and
content of relief. Instead, lawyers for the plaintiff class and HUD
arrived at an informal short-term agreement to experiment with a
83. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 304 (1975) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 880.203(b)).
84. The Court did not make explicit that the provision it cited was not about
race, nor did it explain why it viewed the HCDA as relevant to a racial desegregation
remedy. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 302-04.
85. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
86. See supra pp. 604-05.
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metropolitan approach to relief.8 7 In the process of negotiation, they
also engaged in social invention - using existing federal housing
programs, exploiting the latitude and avoiding the constraints in the
Supreme Court opinion, and learning from the frustrations with the
scattered site program - to create a region-wide program designed
to create housing opportunities at a much faster pace than in the
past.8
87. Plaintiffs' counsel did not want to repeat the experience of the CHA case,
with lengthy and extensive litigation and little housing to show for it. Their willingness
to negotiate was a reflection of the frustration with a decade of hearings, opinions,
orders, and appeals, which had produced only token relief in the city. See supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing CHA remedy and implementation).
An informal agreement process presented the possibility of providing relief more
quickly than in the scattered site program.
It appeared ironic that HUD negotiated even a temporary remedial settlement,
in light of its aggressive and persistent opposition to the plaintiffs' counsel's remedial
proposals. After all, HUD had taken the case all the way to the Supreme Court to
prevent even the consideration of a metropolitan-wide order. See supra notes 22-41
and accompanying text (discussing the path to the Supreme Court). However, part
of HUD's motivation all along presumably was to preserve its administrative prerogatives, rather than having the federal court impose additional restraints on the
agency's subsidized housing programs. Negotiating an agreement reduced the chances
of further judicial intrusion, both in this case and others around the country where
a judicially-imposed Chicago metropolitan-wide order might serve as a precedent.
Moreover, HUD shared an interest with plaintiffs' counsel in bringing about
housing opportunities rather than perpetuating time-consuming and costly litigation.
Providing housing could not only ensure relief for, plaintiff class members; it would
also ultimately end the litigation against HUD and remove the specter of judicial
intervention. As noted, supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text, HUD policy was
also consistent with a metropolitan-wide approach.
For both parties' counsel, reaching an agreement avoided the uncertainty about
the scope and nature of relief the court might adopt. In the absence of precedents
on what circumstances would make metropolitan relief "necessary and appropriate,"
and with little guidance from the Supreme Court on that point, the parties had little
basis for predicting what the district court would do on remand. See supra notes 4660 and accompanying text.
Finally, both parties preserved their option to litigate further. The agreement
was temporary and the initiatives experimental. Either party was free to return to
court if it was dissatisfied with the way things worked out under the agreement.
Agreement Between Plaintiffs and HUD Concerning Implementation of the Gautreaux Supreme Court Decision, [4 Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA), at 40 (June 7, 1976) [hereinafter Letter of Agreement].
88. The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program - or Gautreaux program, was
the result of a relatively brief series of meetings. Alexander Polikoff, chief counsel
for the plaintiffs, Kale Williams, Executive Director of the Leadership Council for
Metropolitan Open Communities, and Irving Gerick, Director of the Illinois Housifng
Development Authority, developed the broad outlines of the program. Polikoff then
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The centerpiece of their agreement was a one-year "demonstration" program to assist plaintiff class families to move into existing
private rental housing throughout the six-county Chicago metropolitan
area. 9 This created a second remedial track in the case, separate and
distinct from the scattered site public housing program in Chicago.
The goal of the new, metropolitan-wide initiative was to use Section
8 rent subsidy funds to facilitate the relocation on a dispersed basis
of 400 families, into existing private housing, primarily in predominantly white areas of the region. 90 HUD was to contract with the
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, a private,
non-profit fair housing agency, to bring together families and landlords to participate in the program. 9'
For the next several years, the parties continued to chart a
remedial course by informal agreements. In 1981, the district court
adopted a consent decree the parties proposed, based on the metropolitan-wide program developed in 1976.92
1. Metropolitan-Wide Scope of the Program
With the 1976 agreement, the geographical area within which
families could secure housing to vindicate their constitutional rights
suddenly expanded dramatically. 9a Even so, the metropolitan focus
was initially temporary and tentative.94 The parties explicitly took no
position on their ultimate views regarding metropolitan-wide relief.
Instead, the demonstration program would enable them to explore
the question so that they and the court could address it on a more
informed basis, on a later day. 95 Finally, the district court formally
refined the program in meetings with Robert Elliott, General Counsel of HUD.
Interview with Kale Williams, Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, in Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 10, 1992). [hereinafter Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/
92].
89. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40. The agreement also provided
for HUD to encourage developers involved in construction or rehabilitation of HUDassisted housing in the region to "make special efforts to house" plaintiff class
families. Id. at 40.

90. Id.
91. Id.

92. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672-83, aff'd, Gautreaux v.
Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 1982).

93. The area included the suburban portions of Cook County and five additional counties.

94. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 668.
95. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40. Presumably, in part because of
the tentative and exploratory nature of the regional approach, the agreement con-
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adopted the metropolitan approach in its 1981 consent decree, determining "that metropolitan area relief is necessary under the circumstances of this case."' ' The court referred to the extraordinary delays
in the scattered site program in the city, resulting in only token relief
in more than a decade and the need for broader measures to ensure
97
needed relief in the foreseeable future.

The consent decree also quantified HUD's ultimate remedial

responsibility. The agency's obligation was to assist 7,100 additional
plaintiff class families to relocate, consistent with the provisions of
the decree. 9

tained no rationale for extending the program beyond the city limits. The decision to
do so reflected instead the results of the negotiation. For plaintiffs' counsel, securing
an agreement to make the program metropolitan-wide was the threshold matter.
Without such an agreement, plaintiffs' counsel would have followed the course the
Supreme Court envisioned, returning to court to seek an order covering the suburbs.
Although HUD strenuously objected to judicial imposition of a metropolitanwide order, HUD policies were consistent with a metropolitan-wide housing strategy.
The agency administered many of its programs on that basis. See supra notes 40-61
and accompanying text. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
reinforced that view. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 302-05 (1975). And HUD's
civil rights policies had evolved in that direction, as well. Lefcoe, supra note 76, at
114-16.
The tentative nature of the metropolitan agreement also facilitated HUD's
agreement. If the program had failed, HUD would have been able to oppose such
an approach in court, based on empirical evidence supporting its position.
Plaintiffs agreed not to seek a metropolitan-wide order from the court for at
least nine months. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 41. Subsequently, two
additional temporary agreements extended the metropolitan-wide program into 1981.
96. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 674.
97. Id. at 666-68, 671-72. Still, there remained no systematic judicial articulation
of the basis for a metropolitan-wide remedy in the case. With the Seventh Circuit's
affirmance of the consent decree without requiring further explanation of the
rationale, it appeared that metropolitanization was a fixture of relief - even if it
had not been fully explained by the courts. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th
Cir. 1982).
98' Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 674. The court of appeals affirmed
the consent decree. The consent decree was challenged on various grounds by three
groups: (1) the Illinois Housing Development Authority; (2) neighborhood organizations; and (3) individual class members. Id. at 669.
The court of appeals pragmatically noted that "[als the essence of settlement is
compromise, a consent decree is never a totally satisfactory victory on all issues for
all parties." Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d at 637.
The 7,100 figure was arrived at through negotiations between counsel for
plaintiffs and HUD. It does not purport to bear a precise relationship to the violation,
especially since the HUD initiatives were only a portion of the relief in the case.
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A Move Toward Privatization

The parties followed the Supreme Court's lead in emphasizing
the private market and relegating the public housing program to a
minor role. Their agreement mentioned the public housing program
only as a possibility they might explore separately from the central
initiatives." So the public housing program, where the violation
occurred, was to play little or no role in HUD fulfilling its remedial
obligations. This approach was in contrast to the original scattered
site public housing remedy in the CHA case.1°°
The parties had several reasons for de-emphasizing public housing. As the Supreme Court acknowledged, Congress began in the mid1970's to phase out funding for new public housing, in favor of the
more market-oriented Section 8 program. 1 1 Also, earlier experience
in the Gautreaux case suggested that suburban officials would not
voluntarily seek federal funds for public housing that would include
Chicago residents. 0 2 Public housing agencies in Chicago's suburbs
had built little housing for families over the years. 103 What they had
built had been for suburban residents and was located mostly in
predominantly Black neighborhoods. 104 Consequently, the Supreme
Court's reaffirmation of local autonomy discouraged efforts to use
the public housing program beyond the city limits. Finally, the
experience with the scattered site program did not bode well for using
public housing as a remedial vehicle. 05 Section 8, with its emphasis
on the private market, seemed more promising than public housing,
if only by default after seven years of minuscule amounts of public
housing production.
Although both the Supreme Court opinion and the parties'
agreement largely ignored public housing and focused instead on the
Section 8 rent subsidy program and increased use of the private
99. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40.
100. See supra pp. 594-95. As discussed supra, at page 596, however, the CHA
remedy was also partially privatized, with the appointment of a private receiver, in
1987. Also, CHA contracted out management of scattered site housing to private
real estate firms and non-profit entities, starting in 1984. With those changes, scattered
site housing ownership remained public; but construction, rehabilitation, and management had all shifted into private hands.
101. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
102. Elizabeth Warren, Center for Urban Policy, Loyola University Chicago,
Urban Insight Series, No. 8, Subsidized Housing in the Chicago Suburbs 3-18 (1981).
103. Id.
104. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, as cited in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
503 F.2d 930, 937 (1974); Warren, supra note 102.
105. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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housing market, the metropolitan-wide program spelled out in the
1976 agreement differed sharply from the hypothetical remedies that
the Supreme Court had discussed.'06 The Supreme Court focused
almost exclusively on Section 8 new construction. In contrast, the
parties' demonstration program emphasized the Section 8 existing
housing program, which the Supreme Court barely mentioned.0 7 The
parties' approach included only a subsidiary role for Section 8 new
construction. 08
The parties focused on existing housing for several reasons. First,
the Section 8 program provided a vehicle for providing low-income
households access to the existing stock. And the experience with the
scattered site program revealed the severe obstacles involved in new
construction, in addition to the problems in relying on the public
housing agency for implementation.'1 9
The 1969 order mandated that CHA add to the supply of housing
as rapidly as possible. Throughout the CHA case, the emphasis
remained on new construction and rehabilitation, which may have
influenced the Supreme Court's vision of metropolitan remedial approaches. "10
Moreover, the Supreme Court's discussion of Section 8 new
construction reduced the appeal of that route, by emphasizing that
local land use controls would continue to prevail."' Exclusionary
zoning and related policies and practices were widespread in Chicago's
suburbs." 2 Challenging local barriers in predominantly white, middleclass suburbs in federal or state court remained costly and time106. See supra notes 51-86 and accompanying text.
107. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40. See also Rubinowitz & Kenny,
supra note 2, at 3-1. When the federal district court formally adopted the program
through a consent decree in 1981, the consent decree characterized it as a program
in "existing housing throughout the Chicago metropolitan area." Gautreaux v.
Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1982).
108. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40. The Letter of Agreement stated
that HUD may advertise for roughly 1,500 Section 8 new construction units. However,
this approach was optional and only addressed briefly after the existing housing
approach. The consent decree formalized the set-aside approach. Gautreaux v.
Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 677.
109. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
S111.
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
112. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Scott Young, Exclusionary Land Use Controls
in Illinois (1983) (on file with the author). See generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ,
LOW-INcoE HoUsiNo:

SUBURBAN

STRATEGIES 27-44 (1974); Lawrence Sager, Tight
STAN. L.

Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
REV.

767 (1969).
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consuming, with uncertain results." 3 Consequently, the Court's reaffirmation of the role of these regulatory schemes made new construction more problematic than if there had been an opportunity to set

4
aside local land use controls in the interest of implementing relief."

Even if judicial set asides had been available, the possibility of having
to return to court would have made the new construction approach
relatively unappealing.

113. The litigation over exclusionary zoning in Arlington Heights, Illinois is one
example. This litigation took approximately seven years (1974-1980) before the parties
agreed on an alternative development site. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980). The Arlington Heights litigation
was still pending when the Letter of Agreement was negotiated. A year later, the
Supreme Court upheld the village's zoning, which excluded a proposed subsidized,
racially mixed development, against an equal protection challenge, because the
plaintiffs had not shown intentional racial discrimination by the village. Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
On remand, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the village might have violated
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act - the Federal Fair Housing Act - because
of the racially disparate impact of its zoning decision. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). The court remanded the
case to the district court for a decision on this question. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. II1. 1979). The parties negotiated
a settlement by agreeing on an alternative site for the development, which was
completed in 1980. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 616
F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
The plaintiff in that case was the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), which was affiliated with the Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities, a key actor in the development of the Letter of Agreement. See
supra note 88.
In other parts of the country, exclusionary zoning litigation has also been timeconsuming and costly. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). Even where courts have struck down local controls and
imposed affirmative obligations, as in New Jersey, there has been little housing
construction for low and moderate-income people as a result. See Martha Lamar et
al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey: 1983-1988, 41
RUTGERS L. REV. 1197 (1989); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I The
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM L. REv. 1, 52 (1990); John Edward
Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986
U. IND. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1986); A. Dan Tarlock, Remedying the Irremediable: The
Lessons of Gautreaux, 64 CHi-KENT L. REV. 573, 581 (1988).
114. See supra pp. 604-05. At the same time, the new construction option was
not ignored in the Letter of Agreement. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40.
Subsidized housing had been built in a number of Chicago's suburbs, thus suggesting
that new construction options had some potential. Warren, supra note 102, at 22.
That experience supported the inclusion of a new construction provision in the Letter
of Agreement.
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Further, the normal delays in planning and building multi-family
housing meant that any new construction strategy would take several
years to begin to bear fruit. In a case fraught with extensive delays
throughout its history, the parties shared an interest in speeding up
the process of providing housing. Gaining access to the existing stock
became a key to the agreement.
The "demonstration" program that was the centerpiece of the
parties' 1976 agreement - later called the Gautreaux Assisted Housing
program or simply the Gautreaux program - was designed to tap the
private housing market.' 15 The program was a hybrid, with the private
housing market, government, and a private, non-profit entity intimately involved. HUD had two key responsibilities - providing rent
subsidies on behalf of plaintiff class families pursuant to Section 8
regulations, and funding the administration of the program by the
116
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities.
Although the program was far from an example of pure privatization, the role of private landlords was crucial. Plaintiff class families
were to move into existing private housing throughout the Chicago
metropolitan area." 7 Local public housing authorities also participated
in the program. The Chicago Housing Authority and several of its
suburban counterparts assumed traditional roles under the existing
housing component of Section 8, such as inspecting apartments and
forwarding monthly rent checks to landlords. 1 8
The Leadership Council's role was also key. Through a contract
with HUD, it served as a matchmaker, or broker, bringing together
families interested in participating and landlords willing to accept
them." 9 The parties assumed that such an intermediary was necessary
to make the market function effectively in this new and uncharted
situation. Families had to be found, screened, counseled, and prepared
for moves that might be near or far. Landlords had to be educated
about the program, and persuaded to participate in it. Leaving it to
the vagaries of the marketplace would not suffice.
Finally, the move toward privatization included a new construction component. HUD was to encourage private developers it assisted
115. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40. The description of the Gautreaux
program occupied almost half of the letter and was the central focus of discussions
among lawyers and other participants in the planning process.
116. Id.; Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 11-13.
117. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40.
118. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 59-72, 111-15.
119. The Leadership Council was to "locate, counsel and assist members of the
plaintiff class to find existing units, and locate owners of housing willing to participate
in the demonstration program." Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40.
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in the Chicago metropolitan area to accept plaintiff class families as
tenants.120 In 1977, HUD agreed to require those developers to set
aside a percentage of their apartments for these families.' 21 When
builders proposed developments and secured federal assistance and
local zoning and construction approvals, they might also participate
supplementary
in the remedial process; but new construction was more
22
than central to the parties' metropolitan strategy.1
IV.

IMPLEMENTING THE GAUTREAUX PROGRAM: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CONSTRAINTS

In the first fifteen years of the Gautreaux program, 4,500 participating low-income Black families relocated in private housing
throughout the Chicago metropolitan area. 23 The majority of them
moved into about 115 predominantly white middle-class suburbs,
providing a degree of racial and economic integration in those communities. 124 The rest of the families moved into more integrated and
predominantly Black areas, largely within the City of Chicago, 25
The scale of the Gautreaux program far exceeded that of the
26
other remedy in the case, the scattered site public housing program.1
Even though it began seven years later, by the early 1990's, the
Gautreaux program had housed more than four times as many
plaintiff class families as the scattered site initiative.
Structural differences between these two remedies help to explain
their contrasting outcomes; but those differences also suggest the
constraints that limited the scale of the Gautreaux program. First, the
scattered site program operated entirely within the City of Chicago,
while the Gautreaux program also encompassed the suburbs through-

120. Id.
121. Letter from Ruth T. Prokop, then General Counsel of HUD, to Alexander
Polikoff (July 29, 1977).

122. This discussion includes two different meanings for the term "set-aside."
The first refers to a court setting aside a statute or ordinance, rendering it temporarily
or partially inoperative, for remedial purposes. The other refers to developers
reserving apartments for members of the plaintiff class. The two uses relate to each

other, because the Letter of Agreement envisioned developers reserving apartments

for plaintiff class families. In theory, such developers might have been able to build

if the court set aside a local zoning ordinance where the community's zoning scheme
excluded the proposed development..
123. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra pp. 596-97.
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out the six-county area. 2 7 Moreover, the scattered site program was
a public housing program, administered for its first two decades by
the Chicago Housing Authority, while the Gautreaux program utilized
the private housing market through the Section 8 rent subsidy program, and a non-profit fair housing organization administered the
program. 2 8 Perhaps equally important, the Gautreaux program emphasized placing people in existing housing, while the scattered site
remedy concentrated on constructing new housing and rehabilitating
substandard housing.
Using existing private rental housing throughout the metropolitan
area enabled the Gautreaux program to far outpace its city counterpart. Significantly, it enabled the program to avoid the community
resistance that stymied the scattered site program.
However, the private housing market in predominantly white
areas of the suburbs and the city also acted as the most serious
constraint on the scale of the program. Families' interest in participating greatly exceeded the amount of housing available to them
through the Gautreaux program. The existing supply did not fully
match the needs of plaintiff class families, especially for larger
families. Moreover, market forces and HUD regulations put much
rental housing beyond the financial reach of the program. Most
importantly, landlord participation was voluntary, and many landlords and property managers accepted very few families through the
program, or declined to participate at all.
As a result, the program proceeded at a steady, but modest pace.
Its emphasis on low-income Black families moving into predominantly
white, middle-class communities meant that the program was unable
to make a breakthrough in the amount of housing available and the
number of families assisted.
A.

THE DEMAND: FAMILIES' INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM

At first, the Gautreaux program elicited skepticism as well as
interest. 29 Some of those who contacted the Leadership Council
replied to the agency's suggestion that they move to the suburbs with
127. See supra note 20.
128. See supra p. 596.
129. The Leadership Council began to notify public housing tenants and people
on the waiting list by mail late in 1976. Of the 19,693 letters originally mailed by the
Leadership Council, there were 2,733 responses. In addition, 3,588 were returned
undelivered from the Post Office. The rate of such returns was much higher for
families on the waiting list than those actually in CHA developments, as the list
contained many old addresses. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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"Are you crazy?"' 30 They had lived their whole lives in the inner city
and could not envision moving to suburbs they had never even heard
of.131

Moreover, relatively few people knew about the program in its
early stages. 3 2 The Leadership Council played the primary formal
role in informing potential participants about the program. The
to selected
Council's original notification system, sending postcards
33
families.
those
reach
to
failed
largely
eligible families,
130. Mary A. Davis, Associate Director, Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities, Presentation at the Chicago Area Fair Housing Alliance Seminar
(June 24, 1992) [hereinafter Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar].
Anthony Downs, a noted urban analyst then based in Chicago, advocated
adoption of public policies that would facilitate the movement of low-income families
to middle-class suburban communities; but he expressed doubts about families'
willingness to make those moves - willingness that whs crucial in any voluntary
initiative like the Gautreaux program:
Ironically, one of the most difficult parts of developing effective economic
integration will be motivating central-city low-and moderate-income households to move into suburban neighborhoods. Most residents of crisis ghetto
areas will not hesitate to move elsewhere if they have a chance. But some
will be reluctant to leave central cities. Many black households in particular
will want to remain in or near large all-black areas rather than move into
largely white neighborhoods.
ANTHONY DOWNS,

OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA

136-37 (1973). This book remains the most extensive exposition of the rationale for,
and means of, opening the suburbs to low-income people from the cities. The
Gautreaux program represents one of the few initiatives that has attempted to put
Downs' strategies to work. See also RUBINOWITZ, supra note 112.
131. Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130. Moreover, a 1979 HUD
study of the program found substantial reluctance to move to the suburbs. Only 12
percent of eligible families who did not participate in the program desired to live in
the suburbs.
As of 1979, 22,655 families were notified, with 6,484 responding. Of the 3,190
invited to a briefing session after they had expressed interest (the Leadership Council
invited only those who did not want placement in Chicago), 1,823, or 57 percent,
actually attended. KATHLEEN A. PEROFF ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. AND URB.
DEV.,

GAUTREAUX

HOUSING DEMONSTRATION:

AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON

34-36 (1979) [hereinafter PEROFF ET AL.]. The study
found that "many families were not interested initially or, if interested, lost interest
when they attended briefing sessions on the demonstration or visited housing sites in
the suburbs." Id. at 8.
132. Interview with Kale Williams, Director, Leadership Council for Metropol(Feb. 24, 1992) [hereinafter, Kale Williams
itan Open Communities, in Chicago, I11.
Interview, 2/24/92].
133. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 50-51. Many of the postcards never
arrived at their intended destination; those that did may have seemed to the recipients
like junk mail to be thrown away unread. Id..
PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS
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That situation changed quickly. Many people learned about the
program as a result of the Leadership Council's continuing outreach
efforts; but informal networks of families, friends, and acquaintances
soon became a crucial source of information.' 34
Although families' initial response to the Gautreaux program was
relatively modest, interest burgeoned quickly and remained high. By
the early 1980s, the Leadership Council had dropped its formal
notification procedure because of the increased numbers of families
applying on their own.'3 5 The agency began an annual in-person
registration process at its downtown office, but in 1985, it abandoned
this increasingly unwieldy process in favor of a one-day-a-year telephone lottery system. 3 6 In cooperation with the Leadership Council,
134. The 1979 HUD study found that 43 percent of all Gautreaux families said
that their source of information about the program was either a friend or a relative.
PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at 123. One woman even mentioned hearing about
the program from a telephone operator:
I called the operator and asked her if she could give me the number of a
place where I could find an apartment in the suburbs that was low subsidized,
and she gave me the Leadership number. She went on to say that she lived
in Schaumburg and when she first moved out there she lived under Section
8. I didn't know what she meant exactly but she told me to go down there
and bring everything I needed and told me good luck.
James Rosenbaum et al., Transcripts from Research for Low-Income Black Children
in White Suburban Schools (1986) [hereinafter Research].
135. Mary A. Davis, The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program 2 (May 7, 1991)
(unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter, Mary Davis Paper]; Kale Williams
Interview 2/24/92, supra note 132.
136. The Leadership Council estimated that 2,000 families would be a reasonable
annual workload, without having an extended waiting list. About one fifth of those
families actually moved each year. In the first years of the registration process, it
took several days of registration to reach the 2,000 figure. In 1984, thousands of
people arrived at the Leadership Council's office on the specified day, filled the
elevators and corridors to the building, and blocked the streets outside. The Council
canceled the registration that day at the request of the Chicago Police, who felt that
they could not control the crowd. Kale Williams Interview 2/24/92, supra note 132.
Not all of the crowd was necessarily part of the demand for Gautreaux: at the time,
a Leadership Council staff member commented that some people in line were not
sure what they were waiting for. Some thought there were jobs at the end of the
line.
The incident was on the front page of the Chicago Defender. Juanita Bratcher,
Multitude Drawn to HUD Offer, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Jan. 24, 1984, at 1,4. See
also, Cynthia-Val Jones, Outline 'Dramatic' Need for Housing, CHICAGO DEFENDER,
Jan. 26, 1984, at 3. After that, the Leadership Council set up a bank of twenty
telephones each year, with staff and volunteers as operators. The Council announced
the number and procedures in advance, through mailings to everyone who had called
the agency about the program during the year, and radio and newspaper announce-
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local newspapers published a story about the program each year
shortly before the sign-up day. 37 These stories described the program

and announced the date and method of contacting the Leadership
Council. 3
By the early 1990s, the telephone company estimated that at least
10,000 calls were made to the Leadership Council on registration
day. 3 9 It is not possible to determine how many different callers tried
to get through, but by that time any initial doubts about the demand

for the program had long since been resolved. 40

ments. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 2-3.
This situation was in stark contrast to the experience of Parma, Ohio, a suburb
of Cleveland. A federal judge ruled in 1980 that Parma had deliberately excluded
Blacks from settling there, and ordered the city to take steps, including advertising
for minorities, to- remedy the situation. By 1988 only three Black families had
responded, with only 57 phone calls made to even inquire about housing for minorities
in Parma. Isabel Wilkerson, Integration Proves Elusive in an Ohio Suburb, N.Y.
TimEs, Oct. 30, 1988, sec. 1, at 1; Suburb Runs Ads for Minorities, but Few Respond,
N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 26, 1988, sec. 1, at 21. Theitwo situations were not directly
comparable: Parma involved one particular city, as opposed to the several counties
involved in Gautreaux. Also, while the suburbs were part of the remedy in Gautreaux,
they were not specifically cited as the problem, as was the City of Parma. See Jeff
Potts, The Gautreaux Program: Factors Affecting Scale and Replicability (unpublished, on file with author).
137. Henry Locke, 12,000 Expected to Enter Section 8 Housing Lottery, CIcAGo
DEFENDER, Jan. 6, 1988, at 3.
138. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132. At one point, the
Leadership Council even invited reporters to observe the telephone lottery in operation
and report on it. This was in response to suspicion on the part of those who called
and were unable to get through that the telephone lottery was a fraud: that the
Leadership Council was not really answering the phone and was picking favorite
families to get into the program. Media presence and the participation of recognizable
people, such as Vincent Lane, the head of CHA, and Alexander Polikoff, the
Gautreaux plaintiffs' lawyer, helped alleviate some of those suspicions. Id.; see also
Michael Gillis, Tenants Dial CHA Escape Line: 2000 Win Places on Waiting Lists,
Cm. SUN-TnEs, Jan. 14, 1989, at 4.
139. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 3.
140. The Leadership Council stopped when it registered 2,000 families each year.
Presumably, this understated the overall demand for the program. On the other
hand, many of the people who made contact through the telephone lottery did not
follow through and thus dropped out of the process. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/
92, supra note 132.
Although the demand for this program grew and stayed high, it did not interest
all members' of the plaintiff class. As Mary Davis, Associate Director of the
Leadership Council has said: "although consumer demand for participation in the
Gautreaux Program remains high, there is presumably a point at which all families
interested in this kind of move will have been served." Mary Davis Paper, supra
note 135, at 7.
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Families' interest in the Gautreaux program resulted from several
factors. Many applied because they wanted to move. They believed
that the benefits of relocating would outweigh the costs - whether
they moved to the predominantly white suburbs the program emphasized, or to mostly Black, integrated, or white areas within the city,
4
which the program also facilitated. '
Moreover, the program's housing subsidies served as a powerful
draw for eligible families, especially those living in private housing
and paying a high percentage of their income for rent. Low-income
families had increasing needs for rental assistance, and other sources
of these subsidies were drying up. Finally, other program elements
acted as incentives to apply, such as counselling for families and the
active recruiting of landlords, both of which reduced families' housing
search costs.
At the same time, not all eligible families sought to participate
in the Gautreaux program. A desire to remain in their community in
the city and concerns about encountering racism in predominantly
white areas led some families to forego applying. 42
1. Benefits and Costs of Relocating
The Gautreaux program focused on facilitating residential racial
integration as its response to the Court's finding of racial discrimination. In an ideal world, families' decisions on whether to participate
in the program would have rested entirely on their preferences as to
the racial composition of the areas in which they lived. However,
plaintiff class families faced choices that were not "free" in that
sense, but were "tainted" in two countervailing respects. First, the
potential for harassment and other forms of racial discrimination
loomed as a deterrent to moving to predominantly white areas. 43
141. The possible destinations varied at different times, depending on housing
and certificate availability in the city and suburbs, respectively. Kale Williams
Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88.
The original Letter of Agreement between HUD and counsel for the plaintiffs
permitted up to 25 percent of all placements to be in the City of Chicago or in
suburban areas of the Chicago metropolitan area with more than a 30 percent Black
population. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40.
142. There are no precise figures on those interested or not interested in the
program. Although it is likely that both groups were substantial, the number of
families' interested far exceeded the amount of housing available through the program. See infra pp. 645-68.
143. In 1968, the Supreme Court had rejected a "freedom of choice" plan as a
remedy for school segregation, suggesting that a discriminatory environment inter-
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Those risks pressed families to avoid the Gautreaux program to the
extent that it meant moving to predominantly white areas.
Other pressures tainted families' choices in favor of the program,
largely because the options of staying put and relocating involved
places that were separate but surely not equal. Housing, schools, and
other conditions of life differed dramatically in middle-class suburbs
from the inner city. Private housing within the city that was available
through the program also offered a better living environment than
fered with Black children's choices. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
see Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728 (1986).

Families contemplating registration for the Gautreaux program faced similar
considerations to those Gewirtz discussed in the school desegregation context. The
choices faced by the New Kent County school children were "tainted" by discrimination, according to Gewirtz, in four distinct ways. First, they chose among restricted
options: discrimination had defined and limited the range of choices, serving to
channel Blacks and whites towards particular places. Certain schools, in this case,
had established racial identities stemming from their already segregated student
populations, faculty, alumni, and even from their names. Second, choices were
tainted by "actual or feared duress from those hostile to desegregation." Id. at 744.
Prior de jure segregation had encouraged attitudes in whites that might lead to threats
or more active forms of retaliation against those Blacks choosing to attend white
schools. Such actions, or fear of them, might serve to coerce Blacks into "choosing"
the Black school.
Third, those making choices had themselves been shaped by prior discrimination,
possibly skewing their attitudes, tastes and preferences. Whites thus refused to attend
formerly Black schools because they did not belong there; Black children desirous of
a less segregated education bore the burden of dislocation. Also, discrimination may
have affected the beliefs and preferences of Blacks, causing them to "have internalized
the perspective of the discriminator that they are unworthy" or to "adapt to the
unavailability of certain options by concluding that they do not really want them."
Id. at 746. Gewirtz notes that while chosen separation may also reflect pride and a
commitment to group self-determination, the "general phenomenon" of attitudes
distorted by discrimination should be considered in evaluating choice remedies to
discrimination. Id. at 747.
Fourth, and finally, choices were tainted by prior segregation through the limited
information Blacks and whites had about each other and about integration. Choosing
the segregated school was self-perpetuating. Also, the choices themselves were made
from unknown options: "[a] person cannot select the racial mix he prefers because
that option can exist only if other people make as yet unmade choices in a certain
way." Id. at 748-49. There is likely to be a "ripple effect of inhibition:" choices are
interdependent, and if some are tainted in any of the ways described, then others
will be affected, and tainted as well. Id. at 749.
See also James E. Liebman, Voice Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 291-92 (1991)
(reviewing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLrmcs, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1990)), for a further discussion of the role of school choice in permitting
racial segregation.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

many plaintiff class families' neighborhoods. l" In that context, choices
to apply for the program might have little to do with a desire to live
in a racially integrated setting.

Families moving through the Gautreaux program emphasized

their desire to "escape" their surroundings.

45

Chicago's inner city -

like many others - was in decline, both absolutely and relative to
other parts of the metropolitan area. 146 Many public housing complexes, in particular, had deteriorated dramatically. 147 A significant

144. Privatization could have increased demand because of the negative image
of CHA housing and the relative attraction of living in private housing. Alex
Kotlowitz described the relief of one boy whose family had managed to move with a
Section 8 certificate (for which they had waited 10 years) from Henry Homer Homes,
a public housing complex, to private housing, one mile south of the complex: "In
those first few months, he knelt at his bedside before he went to sleep and prayed
that God would not make him move back to Homer." ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE
No CHILDREN
100 (1991).

HERE: THE STORY OF

Two Boys

GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA

145. Unless otherwise indicated, the following findings and quotes about families' motivations are based on interviews with women whose families moved to the
suburbs during the first five years of the Gautreaux program. These findings are
reported in James E. Rosenbaum et al., Low-Income Black Children in White
Suburban Schools (Feb. 1986) (unpublished report, on file with the Center for Urban
Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University) [hereinafter CUAPR 1986],
and will be the subject of a forthcoming book by Leonard S. Rubinowitz et al.
146. William Julius Wilson points out that "of the ... twelve community areas
with poverty rates in the 20 percent range in 1980, only five had been poverty areas
in 1970 ....

Whereas only five community areas in Chicago had an unemployment

rate of at least 15 percent in 1970, by 1980 twenty-five community areas did, and of
these, ten (all predominantly Black and all high-to-extreme community poverty areas)
had rates of at least 20 percent unemployment." WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED 50 (1987). GREGORY D. SQUIRES, ET AL., RACE, CLASS, AND THE
RESPONSE TO URBAN DECLINE 96 (1987).

While in the City of Chicago the real income of families (adjusted for inflation)

dropped by 10.1 percent between 1969 and 1979, it rose in the suburbs: suburban
Cook County rose the most, 13.8 percent, followed by Kane County, with 7.2
percent. SQUIRES ET AL., supra, at 41. Between 1960 and 1980, Chicago experienced
a decrease in the number of middle and upper income families of over 30 percent;
suburban Cook County, however, had an increase of more than 30 percent of families
in those categories, and the five other counties of the Chicago SMSA saw a 67
percent growth in the number of middle income families and a 124 percent increase
in the number of upper income families. Id. at 42.
See also THE AMERICAN MILLSTONE (James D. Squires ed., 1986); KOTLOWITZ,
supra note 144, at 5; HAROLD M. MAYER & RICHARD C. WADE, CHICAGO: GROWTH
OF A METROPOLIS (1969); SYLVESTER MONROE & PETER GOLDMAN, BROTHERS (1988).
147. Some of the CHA high rises had reached the point of deterioration where
sections were vacant and boarded up. Tenants in those complexes experienced some
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step up and a desired place to live when they had been built in the
1950's and early 1960's, CHA developments had become for many

residents places to escape by whatever means possible.'

The primary

of the worst conditions and the greatest motivations to find a way to move out.
In 1980, public housing complexes in Chicago contained 10 of the country's
most concentrated areas of poverty. A four-block area of Robert Taylor Homes was
the poorest community in the country; this segment's population of 5,681 had a per
capita income of only $1,339 (the per capita income of Chicago was $6,993, while
that of the country as a whole was $7,200; the country's second wealthiest neighborhood, the "Gold Coast" north of the Chicago Loop, had a per capita income of
$27,000) SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 146, at 94.
Other accounts confirm the dramatic deterioration in the conditions of life in
Chicago's public housing developments from the 1950's and 1960's to the 1970's and
1980's. See also MONROE AND GOLDMAN, supra note 146; LEMANN, supra note 4, at
295-96; Don Terry, Dynamite or Condo: Fears Haunt Cabrini Green, CHICAGO
DEFENDER, July 5, 1980, at 1; Henry Locke, Slayings Spark Citizen's Protest,
CHICAGO DEFENDER, July 30, 1985, at 1; Marsha A. Dada, Complaints Rage at
ABLA: 18 Vacant Apartments a Menace to Residents, CHICAGO DEFENDER, July 28,
1986, at 17; Marsha A. Dada, CHA Neglect Linked to Infant Mortality Rate,
CHICAGO DEFENDER, Aug. 11, 1986, at 17.
148. Some women were particularly painfully aware of the deterioration, because
they had moved into these developments when they were new and offered hope for
a better life. LaJoe Rivers, whose family's story Alex Kotlowitz chronicled in There
are No Children Here, moved into the Henry Horner Homes in 1956, the first tenants
at 1920 West Washington. To them the new buildings were "dazzling." KOTLOWITZ,
supra note 144, at 19. She and the other residents of Homer took advantage of the
myriad of services and programs available. By the time LaJoe Rivers was trying to
raise her children these things had changed dramatically:
There were no banks, only currency exchanges, which charged customers up
to $8.00 for every welfare check cashed. There were no public libraries,
movie theaters, skating rinks, or bowling alleys to entertain the neighborhood's children. For the infirm, there were two neighborhood clinics, the
Mary Thompson Hospital and the Miles Square Health Center, both of
which teetered on the edge of bankruptcy and would close by the end of
1989. Yet the death .rate of newborn babies exceeded infant mortality rates
in a number of Third World countries, including Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba,
and Turkey. And there was no rehabilitation center, though drug abuse was
rampant.
KOTLOWITZ, supra note 144, at 12.
Kotlowitz also pointed to the lack of trust and community he observed in Henry
Homer Homes. Alex Kotlowitz, Speech at the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago Annual Luncheon, Chicago, Il1.(June 9, 1992).
LaJoe Rivers attempted to register for the Gautreaux program in 1991, but was
unable to get through during the telephone lottery. She and her family moved out of
the Henry Horner Homes public housing complex into private housing in a more
desirable Black neighborhood on Chicago's West Side. Author's conversation with
Alex Kotlowitz, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 29, 1991). See also MONROE AND GOLDMAN, supra
note 146, at 22-23; LEMANN, supra note 4, at 106-07.
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concerns that motivated women to leave the inner city were their
families' safety, their children's schooling and social relations, and
49
their own job opportunities.1
Empirical research provides some direct reports of families' motives for moving. In addition, much of the support for the conclusions
about the importance of these concerns comes from women reporting
their post-move experiences, especially in the suburbs. 50 The benefits
and costs that they perceived after the fact did not necessarily coincide
with their motives for moving in the first place. However, a relationship existed between motives for moving and post-move experiences,
at least among families that stayed in the suburbs.
Moreover, word of mouth about those experiences generated
much of the demand over time.' Thus, it seems likely that later
149. Many people had little hope of conditions improving where they lived.
They had witnessed the decline over the years, and saw little evidence that their
public housing complexes or other inner city neighborhoods were going to be rebuilt
- physically, socially, economically, or institutionally. Thus, they saw good reasons
to leave, if they could. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY (1990).
Hirschman argues that people react to situations of decline in firms, organizations, or states, in one of two ways: the exit option, in which people respond by
leaving the situation; and the voice option, in which people stay and express their
dissatisfaction or protest in some way to whoever has authority, or whoever will
listen. Under a situation of perfect competition, the firm involved will be forced to,
in some way, arrest the decline in order to survive. Id. at 4. Hirschman notes,
however, that public agencies (he uses the example of public schools) are insensitive
to exit: they are not directly dependent on consumer generated resources for survival,
and thus are less likely to respond to consumer loss. The use of "voice" in such
situations might be more effective, but it is those who care most about the declining
quality of the "product," who might be "the most active, reliable, and creative
agents of voice," who are most likely to leave. Id. at 46-47. In the case of public
schools, alternatives - private schools, moving to the suburbs - exist for those with
both the resources and the quality-consciousness to do so. When such options exist,
such consumers are likely to act on them. Id. at 51.
In the case of the Gautreaux program and public housing residents, voice was
exercised by the original plaintiffs against the public agency. However, the remedies
in the case sought desegregation through providing additional housing opportunities
for plaintiff class families, and did not address the overall conditions of public
housing in Chicago. The result was that other families faced with a situation of
decline now had the resources, through the Gautreaux program, to exercise the exit
option; those who sought to enter the Gautreaux program, chose, as Hirschman
would have predicted, to do so.
150. Researchers at Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs and
Policy Research have conducted a series of studies of the experiences of participants
in the Gautreaux program. See infra pp. 629-39 for a discussion of the findings.
151. In addition, local newspapers occasionally did feature stories about families'
experiences in the program. See, e.g., Alan Douglas, CHA Rent Subsidy Helping
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applicants' motivations for applying to the program reflected the

Families Find Decent Housing, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 25, 1976, at 25; Project
Dwellers Eye the Suburbs, Cm. SUN-TIMES, August 24, 1977, at 20. These stories
generally portrayed the experiences as quite positive, as seen through the eyes of
participating families.
The Leadership Council assured families of confidentiality about their participation in the program, in order to protect them from harassment. However, at least
one or two families seemed willing to "testify" about their experience publicly. Marc
Fisher, Giving Ghetto Children A Chance in the Suburbs, WASH. POST, June 11,
1988, at Al, A8-10; Robert Reinhold, U.S. Backed Chicago Test Offers Suburban
Life to Ghetto Blacks, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 1978, at Al; William Schmidt, Some
Chicagoans are Moved out of Projects Into a Future, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1989, at
Al.
On May 1, 1991, at its annual Law Day Dinner, BPI commemorated the 25th
anniversary of the Gautreaux litigation. Among the speakers was a woman who had
moved through the program to Evanston, a northern suburb, and who spoke very
positively of the difference the move had made for her family. (author's observation).
Also, two very positive feature pieces about families' suburban experiences in
the program appeared in Chicago Magazine. Barbara Garland, Cabrini Green to
Willow Creek, CHI. MAO., June 1977, at 169-70 [hereinafter Garland]; Barbara
Garland Polikoff, A Ticket Out of Misery: How 1600 Families Escape the Projects
to the Suburbs, Cm. MAG., Jan. 1987, at 97-99. However, Chicago Magazine's
readership is quite affluent, so these articles probably had little direct impact on
families' knowledge of, and interest in, the Gautreaux program.
The Chicago papers reported the results of research on families' experience in
the program, done at Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs and Policy
Research. Jean Latz Griffin, Black Pupils Chalk up Success in Suburbs, Cm. TRIB.,
Dec. 16, 1985, at 1; "And Lessons from Suburbia" (editorial) Cm. TRI., Dec. 22,
1985, at sec. 3, p. 12; How they Broke the Welfare Cycle (editorial), Cm. TRIm.,
May 9, 1990, sec. 1, at 20; William Braden, Children from Projects Thrive in Suburbs
- Study, CHI. SuN-TImEs, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1.
The research of Sharman Stein, Welfare Mothers Find Suburbs Spell Jobs, Cm.
Teas., April 25, 1990, at AI-A2, found that the experiences of families who moved
to the suburbs through the program, and stayed there, were generally positive.
CUAPR 1986, supra note 145; James E. Rosenbaum et al., White Suburban Schools'
Responses to Low-Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and Problems, THE
URBAN REvIEw, Spring 1988, at 28 [hereinafter Responses]; James E. Rosenbaum et
al., Low-Income Black Children in White Suburban Schools: A Study of School and
Student Responses, 56 J. OF NEORO EDUC. 35 (1987); James E. Rosenbaum et al.,
Social Integration of Low-Income Black Adults in Middle-Class White Suburbs, 38
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 448 (1991); James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment
and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 342 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Rosenbaum and Popkinl.

HUD's 1979 study also showed a significant degree of satisfaction among families
who had moved through the program. PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at 13.
The periodic newspaper reports on this research may also have stimulated interest
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experiences of earlier movers - increased safety, better schools, a
reduced risk for the children of destructive social relationships like
gang membership, and more job opportunities. The dominant theme
overall was that the women in these mostly single-parent families
made these moves largely for the sake of their children.
The search for a safe place to live motivated many Gautreaux
program applicants. Danger dominated life in the inner city.' People
lived in constant fear of crime, with the associated stress and other
psychological tolls.' 53 As one Gautreaux participant, Dianne Cotton,
put it: "I would be afraid all of the time in the city. Every time you
went out you'd have to be looking over your shoulder. This is not
15 4
some time. This is all the time. Looking over your shoulder.'
Another, Rebecca Owens, said: "I never felt safe even inside my
home. I was often afraid in the daytime. I lived on the 13th floor
and had safety problems with the elevator. Because of the danger in

in participating in the program. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
There was a quite substantial migration of Blacks to the Chicago suburbs during
this period, independent of the Gautreaux program. Although much of it was to
areas where a Black presence was already well established, that larger migration may
have been known to some plaintiff class families and may have made the moves seem
more feasible and less extraordinary.
From 1970 to 1980, the number of Blacks in the suburban areas of the Chicago
SMSA climbed by 102,526, an increase of 80 percent. John F. Kain, Housing Market
Discrimination and Black Suburbanization in the 1980's, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS:
CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 68, 84-88 (Gary A. Tobin, ed., 1987).
Out of 122 Cook County suburban communities, only six, however, were more than
18.2 percent Black in 1980, and only 17 had as many as 10.2 percent Black households;
91 were less than 2.4 percent Black and 71 were less than 1 percent Black. Id. at 77.
See, e.g., SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 146, at 118-21; James Fuerst, A Housing
'Remedy' We Can Drop ....
CHI. TRm., Apr. 18, 1989, at A19.
152. Over three-fourths of the women who moved to the suburbs through the
Gautreaux program found the following areas in their old neighborhoods dangerous
during the day and night: the streets within a block of their homes, the park nearest
their home, the area near their child's school after school; the elevators and stairways
in their buildings, and public transportation. About half thought the area near their
child's school at recess and being at home were dangerous. Leonard S. Rubinowitz
et al., (forthcoming) (manuscript, chapter on safety, on file with author at Northwestern University School of Law).
153. Id. at 12. A 1990 Community Mental Health Council study in Chicago
found that almost 40 percent of 1,000 high school and elementary students surveyed
had witnessed a shooting, more than one-third had witnessed a stabbing, and 25
percent had seen a murder. JAMES GARBARINO et al., No PLACE TO BE A CHILD:
GROWING UP IN A WAR ZONE 136 (1991).
154. Rubinowitz, et al., supra note 152, at 12.
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the projects, I was often afraid for myself and my children.""'
Gangs and drugs were a constant in their community. 15 6 One
Gautreaux participant, Lenore Sowell, said:
We lived in a bad area, Children were getting shot all around
there .... We were between two different gangs, one on one
side, one on the other. My windows got shot in several times,
we had to sleep on the floor. At night you had to put your
mattress on the floor because bullets would be coming through
7
the windows .... It was like Vietnam.'
The deterioration of inner city schools also motivated families to
move. The 1979 HUD study of the Gautreaux program found that 34
percent of participants judged-good schools to be the most important
factor in their decision to move. 5 ' Women knew that their children
were falling behind, and that their chances in life declined while they
stayed in those schools.
Suburban schools had higher standards than those in the inner
city. 5 9 Later applicants probably had a better sense of the disparities
between the city and suburban schools, thanks to the reports they
received from families who had moved earlier. '6 Not only had they
found higher standards, but teachers provided greater assistance to
students in the suburbs. At the same time, students encountered racial
discrimination in the suburban schools. For many families, the benefits of higher quality schools outweighed the risks of racial harrassment. Over the long term, students from the Gautreaux program in
the suburbs did better than those in the city - in attendance at four
155. Id. Families also limited their daily activities significantly to avoid the
crimes and violence in their environment. Id.at 16.
156. See also Jorge Casuso, High Hopes, CM. TRra. MAG., July 22, 1990, at 12
(hereinafter Casuso], on Vincent Lane, Director of the Chicago Housing Authority
and the first two years of his tenure. Lane gained nationwide recognition for
conducting "sweeps" of 21 of the CHA's 128 high rise buildings: faced with escalating
gang warfare in the Rockwell Garden development, Lane began the sweeps there by
conducting a massive, unit-by-unit security inspection with the police and then erecting
a concrete lobby, issuing tenant identification cards and posting 24 hour security. Id.
at 15-16. Unfortunately, gang members simply shifted their activity to nearby
buildings. Id. at 16.
157. CUAPR, supra note 145, at 76.

158.

PEROFF, ET AL.,

supra note 131, at 105.

159. Responses, supra note 156, at 28.
160. At the same time, some early movers thought the city schools were adequate
until they discovered how far behind their children were when they started school in
the suburbs. Responses, supra note 156, at 31-32.
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year colleges and in going to other kinds of colleges as well. 61
Women also wanted to get their children away from the temptations of joining a gang and from the gangs' pressure to recruit
them. 62 One woman in the Gautreaux program, Lucretia Fletcher,
recalled that gangs tried to recruit her son through pressure and
harassment: "I used to meet my son at the bus stop every day because

there was a bunch of teenage boys who would use guns and knives
''
.and everything to get him to join. 163
Some women remarked on the difference in their children's
friends after they moved to the suburbs. 6 Michelle Holman said:
His friends are better here than in the city. They're not really

bad kids, so they won't get him in trouble. He's around kids
161. James E. Rosenbaum & Julie E. Kaufman, Low Income Black Youth in
White Suburban Schools: Long Term Educational Outcomes 7 (Apr. 3-7, 1991)
(unpublished paper presented at the Ann. Meetings of AERA, Chicago, Ill., on file
with author).
162. Several mothers commented: "Most of the time the teachers would tell him
(her son Russell) to run home. He was afraid of the gangs. When they ask you to
run with them and you don't want to, they pick with you. They would take your
cap and gloves, money, anything else they wanted, and beat you." Rubinowitz et
al., supra note 152, at 8 (Alesa Butler).
The kids had problems at the other schools, you know, the gangs, it was
kind of hard for them to resist that. That's why I moved out, for the two
boys, I found out that it would be much better. When I lived on 79th street
in the city, a kid mugged my kid right in the yard. They began to get scared,
when they would come home, there were kids like that standing around and
would grab them, at that time he was about 14 years old. At school they
would have little cliques, wanted them to join gangs. A lot of time they
would come home afraid, so I started thinking about finding a better place
for them and I did.
Id. at 21 (Margaret Jones).
Veronica Bolden said, "And when I decided to move, it wasn't a hard decision
for me. It was a point of you want them to learn something other than smoking
reefers, breaking bottles, and writing in hallways - stay home. If you want to offer
him something more - move, what can you lose, you know." Research, supra note
134. See also CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 73-74.
Chicago preschool teachers in Head Start and day care programs reported
observing children as young as three years old playing "gang bangers," taking turns
as- shooting victims, mourners and preachers at funerals. Their artwork displayed
gang symbols and gang warfare and arrests. GARBARINO, ET AL., supra note 153, at
139.
163. CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 76.
164. Women who moved to the suburbs said that in the city 27.4 percent of
their children's friends were good influences, while 69.3 percent of their suburban
friends were good influences. CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 98-99.
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who like to do things in school, or go to movies, not gangbanging type kids. He was very upset about gangs in the city,
about how they were always trying to get someone to join.' 65
For the women themselves, the suburbs offered better job possibilities. As in other areas of the country, Chicago experienced a large
scale suburbanization of jobs in the last several decades. 1 Many of
these jobs were within the skill levels of lower-income people. 67 Thus,
moves to the suburbs through the Gautreaux program could provide
access to jobs by enabling families to live near them. In fact, women
who moved to the suburbs through the program were 13 percent more
likely to have a job after the move than program participants who
68
relocated within the city.
Thus, predominantly middle-class suburbs offered
opportunities
unavailable in the inner city.' 69 These relatively affluent communities
offered greater safety, 70 better schools, potentially more positive
165. Id. at 99.
166. Chicago had 68 percent of the region's jobs in 1960, but only 46.6 percent
in 1981. Between 1972 and 1981, Chicago lost 123,504 jobs (9 percent of the city's
jobs), while the suburban portions of the six-county region gained 286,698 jobs, an
increase of 26 percent. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES,
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF JOBS, HOUSING SEGREGATION AND MINORITY UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 3 (1983). A follow-up study showed that

by 1989, the suburban portion of the region's job market had grown to 59.5 percent;
Chicago had lost an additional 10,461 jobs, and the suburbs had added 427,952 jobs,
with the largest growth in suburban Cook County and DuPage County. LEADERSHIP

COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES, JOBS, HOUSING, AND RACE IN THE

A GEOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE 11 (1991) [hereinafter
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (1991)].
167. DuPage County and Northwest Cook County made gains in the manufacturing sector. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (1991), supra note 166, at 3. Overall, according
to the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission, the Chicago suburbs gained more
than 133,000 lower-income jobs. Id. at 4.
168. Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 151, at 348. Also, 46 percent of suburban
movers who were never employed before going to the suburbs found work there;
while 30 percent of participants who stayed within the city who had not worked
before found work after their move. Id. The greater number of job opportunities in
the suburbs was the most important factor in easing their search for work. Id.
The grown children of families in the suburbs were also more likely than city
movers to be employed full-time, if they were not in college, and to have better pay
and job benefits. James Rosenbaum & Julie Kaufman, Educational and Occupational
Achievements of Low-Income Black Youth in White Schools, 12-13 (August 1991)
(unpublished paper given at the Ann. Meeting of the Am. Sociological Ass'n, on file
with author).
169. PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at 104; Garland, supra note 151, at 132-33.
170. Rubinowitz et al., supra note 152, at 24; CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA:

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

social relationships for children, and increased job opportunities.'7

Although relatively unimportant to them, some families viewed
the opportunity for racial integration as an additional draw, beyond

the economic integration factors.7 2 Some women wanted their children

to be exposed to different kinds of people, because they would have

to live and work in a predominantly white society when they grew
up. 173

On the other hand, the Gautreaux program's relocation require-

ment, especially with its emphasis on predominantly white areas and
the suburbs, made the costs of the program outweigh its benefits for
some eligible families. Some families did not want to live among
white people, especially in almost all-white settings. 74 Even families
73-74. See Wilhelmina A. Leigh & James D. McGhee, A Minority Perspective on

Residential Racial Integration, in

HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY

31-

42 (John M. Goering ed. 1986). The authors argue that Blacks will seek to live in
racially integrated neighborhoods when such a move would provide better housing,
high levels of amenities, lower crime rates, and better municipal services. Id. at 34;
see also, Joe T. Darden, Choosing Neighbors and Neighborhoods: The Role of Race

in Housing Preference, in DIIDED NEIGHBORHOODS 15, 26-27 (Gary Tobin, ed. 1987).
171. CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 19-58; PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at
104.

172. CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 93-94; PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at
105; see also Robert A. Slayton, An Accepted Member of the Community, in FAIR
HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN CHICAGO: PERSPECTIVES AFTER Two DECADES, REPORT

TO THE CHICAGO FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE

(1986). Few families in this study of those

making "nontraditional" moves - across area racial boundaries in the Chicago
suburbs - listed integration as being a factor in their decision to move; "One thing
that many of these families were not looking for in a new location was integration.
The interviews revealed that most of the families chose their home for some reason
other than the intentional desire to make an integrated move." Id. at 244.
173. Racial factors seem to have been a much stronger factor in limiting demand
for the Gautreaux program than in attracting people to it. See infra pp. 634-640.
174. There was also literature from other places that cast doubt on Blacks'
willingness to move to mostly white areas. See T.F. PETIGREW, NATIONAL ACCADEMY
OF SCIENCES, ATTITUDES ON RACE AND HOUSING: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW
(1973).
Some, though not all, of the more recent survey literature on the housing
preferences of Blacks supports the claim that Blacks might be reluctant to move to
areas in which whites predominate. One major study of 743 white households and
400 Black households in the Detroit area found that 62%'o of the Blacks interviewed
would not be willing to move into an all-white area; the large majority of these
respondents, about 90%'0 of them, related this preference to the belief that whites
would not welcome them, not to a desire to live among Blacks per se. Reynolds
Farley et al., Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs: Will the Trend Toward Racially
Separate Communities Continue?, 7 Soc. Sci. RES. 319, 331 (1978); see also Darden,

supra note 170, at 15;
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willing to leave their community had concerns about the risks of

moving into predominantly white areas. '7 They feared encountering

EXPERIMENT 123 (R. Struyk & M. Bendick eds., 1981); PAUL B. FISCHER, THE
STEPHEN H. WILDER FOUNDATION,

Is HOUSING

MOBILITY AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-POVERTY

STRATEGY?: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CINCINNATI EXPERIENCE 5 (1991); Reynolds

Farley et al., Barriers to Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan., 1979, at 197-213; Michael H. Schill,

Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 32-34, on file with author); D. Garth Taylor, Housing, Neighborhoods and
Race Relations: Recent Survey Evidence, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI., Jan.,
1979, at 26-40.
Surveys of Blacks in Chicago and elsewhere have indicated an interest in living
in integrated communities if they were about half white and half Black. A 1978 HUD
survey found that 57 percent of all Blacks and 15 percent of all whites would prefer
a fifty-fifty white/minority ratio. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urb. Dev., The 1978
HUD Survey on the Quality of Community Life: A Data Book 298-99 (1978); see
also Leigh and McGee, supra note 170; Darden, supra note 170. Very few such
communities existed in Chicago. Moreover, moves to places with more than thirty
percent Black population did not meet the Gautreaux program's integration goals.
175. The Chicago metropolitan area remains one of the most racially segregated
in the country. On a residential segregation index scale - measuring the percentage
of either racial group that would need to move from one census tract to another in
order to eliminate segregation if the population size of each tract was fixed (if all
Blacks lived in one area and all whites in another, the index would be 100) - Chicago
measured 91 in 1970 and 88 in 1980. Reynolds Farley, Residential Segregation Among
Blacks, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 274, 276-79 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson,
eds., 1991); see also SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 146, at 106; Pierre de Vise, Chicago,
First In Residential Segregation in 1970, in INTEGRATED EDUCATION, 1971, VOL. IX
no. 6 (both of these sources place Chicago as the most segregated city of its size;
Farley includes smaller cities as well). According to a Leadership Council study, in
the City of Chicago, 80 percent of the census tracts had white or Black populations
of over 90 percent. Of the 258 municipalities that make up the six county area
surrounding the City, 177 had less than 1 percent Black population. Kale Williams,
The Dual Housing Market in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, in HOUSING: CHICAGO
STYLE 38, 39 (I11.Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm'n. on Civil Rights, 1982).
The Gautreaux program's integrationist goals led to an emphasis on moves to
predominantly white suburbs. Substantial numbers of Blacks lived in Chicago's
suburbs, mostly in predominantly Black and substantially racially mixed inner ring
communities west and south of the city. SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 146, at 123.
According to the 1980 Census, of the 1,427,400 Blacks in the Chicago SMSA, 230,236
were not in the city of Chicago. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION,

ISTICS: ILLINOIS

1980

CENSUS

GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTER-

27, 31 [hereinafter

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].

By 1980,

almost two-fifths of those Black suburbanites lived in majority Black suburbs. James

W. Fossett & Gary Orfield, Market Failure and Federal Policy: Low Income Housing
in Chicago 1970-1983, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION 158, 175-76 (Gary Tobin, ed., 1987) [hereinafter Fossett & Orfield].
The program largely excluded those areas as possible destinations.
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racial discrimination and the loss of their children's racial and cultural
identity. 7 6 The women especially felt a sense of social isolation because
of the absence of Black women and men.
Black families moving into predominantly white areas of Chicago
or the suburbs risked hostile reactions, including physical violence,
damage to property, and other forms of harassment. 77 Those risks

176. Kama West, a woman who moved to the suburbs, said: "Sometimes I feel
he's losing his Black identity. When that happens I take him to the city so that he
can reacquaint himself with his Blackness. He tells jokes about Black people sometimes." Another, Eva Bethel, reported about her son:
What I'm really trying to say is that his image of how he's supposed to be
is influenced by his school being 90% white. He talks like a little white
suburban child .... He's patterned himself after them so he'll fit in ....
It's not bad. His diction is good. But I don't think that . . I think that
he's missing what you get when you go to a South Side school. Because
there is definitely a culture there that is rich.
Research, supra note 134.
The likelihood that suburban schools would not attend adequately to Black
history and culture added to these concerns. CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 22-23.
Some theorists of cultural identity formation share these women's concerns. See
Earnest D. Washington, A Componential Theory of Culture and Its Implications for
African-American Identity, 24 EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 24 (1988). Washington argues
that too much difference between the culture of the community from which a student
comes and that of the school which he or she attends may have a deleterious effect
on the child's development. See also GENEVA GAY, EXPRESSIVELY BLACK (1987).
177. See WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., RACE RIOT (1970), about the 1919 race riot
triggered by a Black venturing onto a "white" beach; ARNOLD R. HmsCH, MAKING
THE SECOND

GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING

IN CHICAGO

1940-1960 (1983), which

discusses Blacks moving in to public housing. See also ALAN B. ANDERSON & GEORGE
C. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO (1986); DAVm J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

(1988), about the open housing demonstrations led by Martin Luther King, Jr. in
1966 and the cancellation of the proposed march into Cicero - because of the
likelihood of violence.
In 1970, in Murray Park, a home occupied by Blacks on a mostly white block
was shot at and pelted with bricks. BRIAN J.L. BERRY, THE OPEN HOUSING QUESTION:
RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1966-1976 198 (1979). A year later four homes in
the same community into which Black families were moving were destroyed by fire;
in one case, a two gallon gas can was found forty feet away. Id.
Resistance to Blacks moving in to white Chicago neighborhoods persisted: In
the spring of 1984, a Black family renting a house in a white neighborhood on the
Southeast Side was forced to move after its garage was burned and windows were
repeatedly broken. Later that same year in another white neighborhood, a Black
couple and their small son escaped unharmed from their newly rented apartment
where they had been under siege for six hours, as neighborhood residents hurled
rocks at their home. SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 146, at 102. Stories about similar
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continued to exist as families considered such moves through the
Gautreaux program. Both their perceptions and the realities of the
racial climate probably deterred many families from applying, especially in the program's early days.
As Black families moved to predominantly white areas through
the program, they did not experience their worst fears of racial
violence and constant harassment. But some families encountered
racist reactions in the suburbs, including threats of physical injuries
to their families and property, and more frequently verbal harassment

and ostracism. 7 In the early studies, the women reported a range of

experiences, from being called names - "Hey, nigger!" - to being
run off the road, to incidents of harassment by the police. Word of
mouth about these negative incidents and experiences may help to
explain why some families did not apply to the program.
Some friends and families of those who planned to move to

predominantly white communities raised these objections to discourage them from doing so.17 For example, fifteen years into the
program, a landlord in Cicero, a notoriously racially exclusionary

suburb, agreed to accept a family through the program. The family
ultimately decided not to make the move, on the advice of friends
and family members concerned about the racial hostility they would

encounter there.180
For other families, staying in the Black community represented
an ideological, political, social, or personal commitment to maintain-

racial incidents also appeared in Chicago's Black newspaper, the Chicago Defender.
See Sandra Crocket, Racists hit 13 Homes in 85, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Jan. 23, 1986,
at 3; Charles A. Davis, Open Housing: A Nightmare, CHICAGO DEFENDER, May 10,
1984, at 17; Lawrence Muhammed, Harass Family in Calumet Park, CHICAGO
DEFENDER, Sept. 10, 1977, at 1; see also Jessica Seigel, Racial Attack on bus Driver
Called Isolated Suburb Incident, Cm. TRIB., May 24, 1990, at 9.
Data on the residential preferences of Blacks also suggests that such preferences
were strongly influenced by the perceived reactions of whites to the presence of
Blacks: those who preferred racially mixed areas stated that they did so for reasons
of racial harmony, while those who preferred all Black areas stated a desire to avoid
interracial problems. Darden, supra note 170, at 25.
178. Claire Monroe stated that the police "will just stop you on general
principles," and recounted a string of incidents including one in which she was strip
searched three times and thrown in jail for the night for passing a school bus.
Rubinowitz et al., supra note 152, at 51-54; CUAPR 1986, supra note 145, at 94-96.
179. Some family and friends warned participants about potential violence or
discrimination: "immediately there would be cross burnings and lynchings" (Suzanne
Franklin) or "the water would be cut off and I wouldn't have any water" (Hazel
Tucker). Research, supra note 134.
180. Kale Williams Interview 3/10/92 supra note 88.
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ing or rebuilding the Black community and its institutions.,' Some
objected to the Gautreaux program as ideologically and politically
inconsistent with the need to address the problems of the inner city.

Leaders and citizens criticized the program as draining off resources,
attention, commitment, and people from the Black community's
extremely pressing needs.

82

Others opted out of the program for

181. Earlier, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton criticized integration:
"The fact is," they argued, "that integration, as traditionally articulated, would
abolish the black community. The fact is that what must be abolished is not the
black community, but the dependent colonial status that has been inflicted upon
it ....

The racial and cultural personality of the black community must be preserved

and that community must win its freedom while preserving its cultural integrity."
STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 55 (1967); see also John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing vs. Fair
Housing: The Problems with Providing Increased Housing Opportunities Through
Spatial Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7 (1980). Calmore argued that
forcing deconcentration of minorities was, in effect, victim blaming - forcing the
minority poor to sever social and political ties to their communities in order to find
decent housing, because those communities had been neglected. Id. at 17.
Michael Tein argues that Gautreaux and similar post-Gautreaux remedies engage
in "forced dispersal" that implies a view of "valid community as white-over-black"
and "solidifies an already-entrenched racial hierarchy." Michael Tein, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Housing Discrimination, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 1463, 1502 (1992).

182. Dr. Conrad W. Worrill criticized "the plan by the white power structure
of Chicago to systematically force large numbers of black people out of what is
called the inner city," particularly citing Downs' Opening Up the Suburbs - "white
social science methodology at its finest" - claiming that his real agenda was "the
dispersion of black people from the city and the creation of black enclaves throughout
suburbia, so that whites can maintain racial dominance in both the city and the
suburbs." Decrying a history of forced migrations, Worrill asked, "why should we
again be maneuvered from the land that we occupy?" Conrad W. Worrill, The
Threat of Black Removal, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Oct. 3, 1984, at 13. William Simpson
argued:
Even if studies show that the most propitious way to "move up" is to leave
the inner-city for the suburbs, doing so under the auspices of white-run
programs that operate from a viewpoint that discourages African-Americans
living next door to each other is a concession to interminable subordination
of black people .... The immigration away from any community leaves
little foundation of the kinds of individuals needed to sustain the viability
of the territory left behind. Just as important a question is that of blacks'
immigrating to "promised lands" as pawns of manipulative "scattering"
plans run by whites who have displayed scorn for the inclination of black
people (as all people) to want to live with their "own kind."
William Simpson, A Blueprint for 'Black Flight'?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1991, sec. 1,
at 19.
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personal reasons, such as wanting to remain involved in a church or
other institutions integral to their lives. 3
Some families had invested themselves in revitalizing their communities. Some families had become active in improving the conditions
of their public housing complexes, through tenant management initia-

tives begun in some CHA -complexes in the 1980's.'84 Other public
housing tenants organized advocacy groups to press for improved
conditions.' 85
Families living in other parts of the inner city also committed
themselves to staying and rebuilding their neighborhoods. They tried
183. Iris Jones, one of the first clients in the program, changed her mind about
moving while she was en route to her new apartment. The development was in
DuPage County, about twenty-five miles from the city. DuPage County was one of
the country's most affluent counties, and only 1.2 percent of the county's entire

population was Black. Iris Jones got stuck in a rush hour traffic jam, which led her
to reconsider the move because she was heavily involved in her church and had
anticipated at least weekly trips to the city for that purpose. See Rubinowitz &
Kenny, supra note 2, at 105-06; see also, Lisa Golf & Mark Miller, DuPage the
Arrogant, CRALN's Cm. Bus., April 28, 1990, at 19; Jacqueline Heard, Blacks find
DuPage Success has a High Price, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1990, sec. 2, at 1.
Another woman indicated her desire to remain in the Black community: "I
wouldn't want to leave and go to the suburbs. The suburbs is fine but I like it on
the west side of Chicago where I live and reside. I have a lot of things in common.
We have good transportation, we have good communication . . . ." The Gautreaux
Decision and its Effect on Subsidized Housing: Hearing Before A Subcomm. on
Government Operations of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(testimony of Francis Lee, Lawndale resident).
184. See LYNDA GOROV, "COME SEE WHAT I'M SAYIN' COMMUNITY RENEWAL
SOCIETY OCCASIONAL PAPERS, July 1989, at 1, on Bertha Gilkey's work on tenant
management in Chicago; Gilkey had helped turn around the Cochran Gardens
development in St. Louis through tenant control, and spoke of a commitment to
help others do the same: "Public housing is not a project to public housing tenants.
It is a home, a neighborhood, a community. We feel the same about our home as
you do." Id. at 6.
In 1986, tenant management began at Chicago's LeClaire Courts housing development. Juanita Bratcher, CHA Tenants Tout Resident Management Plan, CMCAGO
DEFENDER, Mar. 1, 1986, at 10; see also, J.S. Fuerst, Note on Policy: Tenant
Management in Low-Rent Public Housing, SOCIAL SERVICE RE iEw, June 1988, at
337.
Some of these activists may have been ambivalent about the Gautreaux program.
Their efforts to improve conditions did not foreclose the possibility of leaving,
however.
185. One such organization filed suit against the CHA, claiming that the
conditions in their public housing complex did not meet minimum standards required
by law. Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 91-C-3316 (N.D.
Ill. filed Nov. 19, 1991).
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to secure increased public funding for housing construction and
rehabilitation in their neighborhoods, as186 well as Section 8 rent certificates for use in the Black community.
Thus, the mobility aspect of the Gautreaux program meant
different things to different members of the plaintiff class. For large
numbers of families, it was a vehicle for moving to what they hoped
would be a better life - especially for their children. For others, the
program held little appeal, because it required leaving homes and

communities which they cared about, and risking racial hostility in
the process.
2.

Housing Subsidies

In addition to its mobility feature, the Gautreaux program offered

low-income people desperately needed housing subsidies .1s7 Conse-

quently, the rent subsidies themselves became an increasingly powerful
draw to the program for plaintiff class families, especially those living
in private, unsubsidized housing. Participation in the program ensured
that families could receive rent subsidies for at least five years, as
long as they stayed in the program and were not evicted.' 8
During the program's first fifteen years, low-income families'
need for housing subsidies increased very significantly, at the same
time that the general availability of those subsidies declined dramati-

186. At a 1981 hearing regarding the consent decree between the plaintiffs and
HUD, residents of Black neighborhoods spoke out against the Gautreaux program's
remedy, preferring instead that housing be developed in their neighborhoods. Others
stated that they did not want to move to the suburbs, where they knew no one and
access to needed services and transportation was extremely difficult. Testimony of
Jerome Butler, representing six plaintiff class members objecting to the consent
decree, Jan. 19, 1981, at 109, of the consent decree Fair Hearing transcripts (arguing
that discrimination remedy should not make plaintiff class members choose between
remaining in the communities they cared about and relocating to qualify for subsidized
housing).
Testimony of Georgia E. Day, Lawndale resident, Jan. 19, 1981, at 23 of Fair
Hearing transcripts, stating "I want to be where I am known and I am somebody,
and I have somebody around me that I can call on."
Testimony of Marie Henderson, 30 year Lawndale resident, Jan. 19, 1981, at 26
of Fair Hearing transcripts. (She stated she feared that people would be forced to
move; people had lived in Lawndale all of their lives and didn't want to leave. She
argued that housing should be built in Lawndale.). The Court approved the consent
decree, Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. I11. 1981).
187. Many families in CHA's regular Section 8 program had opted for "in
place" subsidies, rather than moving. This suggests that subsidies rather than
relocation was important for many low-income families.
188. Continuation of subsidies beyond that time was highly likely but not certain.
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cally. I8 9 Increasing numbers of low-income Chicagoans paid a very
high percentage of their income for rent - far more than the 30
percent generally considered the maximum appropriate - leaving
little for other necessary expenditures. 90 Renters faced an increasing

double bind: their income declined at the same time that rents
increased - thus expanding the gap between the cost of decent
housing and their ability to pay for it.191 The decline in the value of

welfare benefits in real dollars was an important factor in their reduced
income, particularly in Illinois.

92

A dwindling supply of affordable

housing for low-income people brought rent increases in the remaining
stock. 193 At the same time, the 1980's witnessed a dramatic cutback
189. In 1975, there were 157,100 low cost units in the Chicago metropolitan area
but 231,900 low-income renters. By 1987, there were only 150,900 low cost units, but
there were 299,900 low-income renters. The shortage of affordable rental units thus
went from 75,000 in 1975 to 149,000 in 1987, almost doubling. MARK SHEFT, CENTER
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS: A PLACE TO CALL HOME. THE
CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR XIV (1991).

190. The Department of Housing and Urban Development considers an affordable unit to be one costing 30 percent of household income. Id. at 15.
In 1987, one quarter of all renters in the City of Chicago - 26 percent - paid
at least 50 percent of their income for housing. A 1991 study reports that poor
renters in the Chicago metropolitan area were actually worse off than the nation on
average: in 1987, 65 percent of poor renters nationwide spent 50 percent of their
incomes in housing, while the figure was 69 percent for poor renters in the Chicago
SMSA. Id. at 8.
The rent burden in Chicago was particularly high for poor Black households:
on average, poor Black households were paying almost 80 percent of their income
for housing in 1983. Fossett & Orfield, supra note 175, at 170-71.
191. SHEFT, supra note 189, at 18-19. Between 1975 and 1987, the median income

for all renter households in the Chicago area fell 17 percent, adjusting for inflation,
going from $21,252 to $17,723; housing costs of the typical renter household,
however, increased by 14 percent (also adjusting for inflation) from $379 per month
to $432 per month. Id. at 19.
192. Id. at 35-37. The largest possible AFDC benefit, the primary source of
public assistance for plaintiff class members, for a Chicago area family of three with
no other income went down by 54 percent between 1970 and 1991 (adjusting for
inflation). By 1991, the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment in the Chicago
metropolitan area was approximately 75 percent higher than the maximum AFDC
grant for a family of three. Id. at 36.
193. Fossett & Orfield, supra note 175, at 171-72. A substantial percentage of
Chicago's low-income housing was also physically substandard: In 1987, 20 percent
of the units occupied by poor renters had moderate or severe physical problems.
SHEFT, supra note 189, at 41. While only 11 percent of all households in the Chicago
area, poor households occupied "4201o of the units with evidence of rats; 400o of the
units with severe physical problems; 3407o of the units with exposed electrical wiring;
33% of the units with holes in the floor; 28% of the units with open cracks in the
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in federal housing programs, the primary source of housing subsidy
funds. 19

The so-called housing-renter income gap led many low-income

families to seek housing subsidies wherever they could. But there were

few such avenues available. CHA's waiting list for public housing

1 95
complexes was thousands of families and many years long. Simi96
larly, CHA's regular Section 8 program was vastly over-subscribed.'
The Section 8 waiting list was so long that CHA periodically stopped
taking applications for extended periods of time.197
Thus, the Gautreaux program was the last best hope for many

low-income families in search of assistance in meeting housing costs.

The telephone lottery system produced a new waiting list and another
shot at subsidies each year. Those who got through could begin their

housing search within weeks or months, rather than the years they
might have to wait if they were fortunate enough to get on a waiting
list for another program. 98 Consequently, many families were willing
to relocate wherever the program specified, in order to get the housing
subsidies it provided. 99
interior walls; 26% of the units with broken plaster." Id. at 43.
The loss of housing stock, primarily through demolition, exceeded the additions
through housing programs. This produced a net loss of low-income units. Id. at 1718. At the same time, middle-class migration to the suburbs slowed, thus slowing the
filtering process by which most low-income people secure their housing. Fossett &
Orfield, supra note 175, at 165. Countering that trend however, was a decrease in
the number of low-income and Black people migrating from the South, thus relieving
some pressure from the demand side of the equation. Id. at 162.
194. From fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1980, federal government commitments
for rental assistance through the Department of Housing and Urban Development
averaged 290,000 new low-income households per year. From fiscal years 1981 to
1991, however, HUD commitments averaged only 78,000 additional low-income
households per year, a decrease of almost 75 percent in new assistance per year on
average. SHEFT, supra note 189, at 21-22.
195. In some CHA complexes, there were abandoned apartments and boarded
up floors, because of the danger and deterioration. By 1988, when Vincent Lane
took over as Director of the Chicago Housing Authority, about one sixth of the
CHA's 40,840 apartments were vacant. Casuso, supra note 156, at 15. By 1989,
vacancies increased by 1,103, to a total of 7,321 vacancies. Id. at 16. The lengthy
waiting lists were for units considered habitable. Id. at 22-25; see also, KOTLOWITZ,
supra note 144, at 127.
196. SHEFT, supra note 189, at 23.
197. In 1985, the Chicago Housing Authority closed the waiting list for privately
owned subsidized rental housing because they were receiving 5,000 new applicants
per day; as of 1991, it was still closed. Id.
198. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 3.
199. Not all plaintiff class families were eligible for these subsidies. Some may
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Other ProgrammaticIncentives

In addition to the forces favoring families' relocating and their
need for housing subsidies, the Gautreaux program included other
incentives for. families to participate. The Leadership Council assisted
families both before and after their moves in ways that added to the
program's appeal.
First, the Leadership Council reduced families' housing search.
Housing searches were very costly, in time and money, for low-income

Blacks. 200 Many households had little experience in the housing search

process. Racial discrimination often made the process longer and
20 1
more costly for them.
Searching in outlying areas of the city and in the suburbs, as the
Gautreaux program emphasized, added substantially to the already
high search costs. Very few plaintiff class families were familiar with
the areas involved or had easy ways of finding out about them. They
were not likely to have spent time there - especially in farther out
have increased their income beyond the ceiling for Section 8 subsidies, thus making

them ineligible for the Gautreaux program. Others may have already been receiving
Section 8 subsidies, since all of the families eligible for the Gautreaux program were
also eligible for CHA's regular Section 8 program.
200. Francis J. Cronin & David W. Rasmussen, Mobility, in HOUSING VOUCHERS
FOR THE POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 107, 127-28 (Raymond J.
Struyk and Marc Bendick, Jr. eds., 1981). Added search costs faced families in the
Gautreaux program because of both their income and their race. Low-income renters
generally had difficulty knowing where to search, transportation problems in getting
to places that might be of interest, discrimination experienced or expected, and
difficulty finding housing meeting quality requirements of subsidy programs. Glen
Weisbrod & Avis Vidal, Housing Search Barriers for Low-Income Renters, 16 URB.
AFF. Q. 465 (1981) (study of the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, which
had similar housing quality requirements to those in the Gautreaux program).
Research suggests that housing searches for Blacks are more time-consuming and
costly than for whites, at least for home purchases. Robert Lake, studying housing
search experiences of Black and white homebuyers, found qualitative and quantitative
differences which raised Blacks search costs. Blacks' searches required more time
prior to active search "to assess options, consider alternatives, collect information
and overcome hesitations. Black households in the sample similarly spent significantly
more time in active search, again accumulating greater costs of time and effort and
foregone benefits." ROBERT W. LAKE, THE NEW SUBURBANITES: RACE AND HOUSING
IN THE SUBURBS 172 (1981). Lake concluded that Blacks' more costly search was due
to a combination of overt discrimination and Blacks' adaptation to avoid discrimination.
201. John Yinger, The Racial Dimension of Urban Housing Markets in the
1980's, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION
43, 46-47 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987). Cronin & Rasmussen, supra note 200, at 127-

28.
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suburbs - or to have informal networks of family and friends who
20 2
lived there.
Many participating families probably would not have applied if
they had not had access to the Leadership Council's counselling. The
program provided information about available rental housing and the
communities in which it was located, and counselors often accompanied families to those sites. As the program evolved, the Leadership
Council increasingly emphasized training families in how to undertake
housing searches on their own, providing them with information they
needed to look for rental units in unfamiliar suburban and city areas.
These efforts reduced families' housing search costs significantly, as
20 3
well as their risk of failing to find a place in the allotted time.
In addition, the Leadership Council provided families with information they needed after their moves. 2 04 This included referrals to
services and facilities in the new communities and assistance in
resolving matters with landlords. In addition, Leadership Council
staff tried to develop an informal information and support network
among families living near each other in the suburbs. 20 5 The availability of support services reduced the risks associated with moving,
thereby encouraging greater participation.
In addition to the concrete incentives the Gautreaux program
provided, families moved in part because relocating in search of a
better life reflected an American ethos. 20 More importantly, migration
was a basic element of the Black experience in this country, from the

202. Garland, supra note 151, at 132.
203. The Leadership Council followed its group briefing sessions about the
program with individual counselling of clients. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92,
supra note 132.
204. After a family moved into its apartment, their assigned counselor was
available to assist them with questions or concerns for 90 days after the move. After
that, the Council's Supportive Services Program provided further assistance, such as
a directory of community services, including child care and medical facilities. The
Council also held monthly meetings to help families considering moving again look
for new housing. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 4.
205. Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130.
206. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 149, at 108-13. Hirschman noted that the American
idea of success and social mobility - from the country's origins to the movement
west to the continuing immigration of the present era - depended on the ability to
exercise the-"exit option" and thereby leave a bad situation for a better one: "Success
is in fact symbolized and consecrated by a succession of physical moves out of the
poor quarters in which [a person] was brought up into ever better neighborhoods."
Id. at 109. Such relocation was for Americans a "paradigm of problem-solving." Id.
at 107.
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Underground Railroad 2 7 through the two "Great Migrations" of the
twentieth century, when hundreds of thousands of southern Blacks
20
migrated to the urban centers of the North. 8

The high level of demand for the Gautreaux program was born

largely out of desperation with the conditions of life in poverty and
the potential for improving those, conditions by participating in the
program. The growing interest in the program told a story of the
horrendous situation of Chicago's poor - the dangerous and deteriorating environment of the inner city and the great need for housing
subsidies. An intense desire for a better life, especially for their
children, led many families to try to register for the Gautreaux
program. Increasing awareness of other families' experiences led still
more people to conclude that it was an option worth pursuing. 29
B.

THE SUPPLY: HOUSING AVAILABLE TO THE PROGRAM

The high level of interest in the Gautreaux program among plaintiff
class families shifted the challenge to the task of securing housing for
them.210 Including the suburbs in the program vastly expanded the
housing potentially available to the program, compared to a city-only
initiative. The Chicago metropolitan area encompassed over 250 suburban communities that were potential sources of housing for the Gautreaux

207. In the perennial struggle as outsiders, Blacks were used to being "strangers
in a strange land." SARAH H. BRADFORD, HARRIET: THE MOSES OF HER PEOPLE 3132 (reprint 1981) (1886).

208. SPEAR, supra note 4; LEmANN, supra note 4; GROSSMAN, supra note 4.
209. There is no way of knowing precisely what tipped the balance for individual
families, or in the aggregate. The demand grew dramatically in this program, but
that is not necessarily the case elsewhere. Efforts to attract Blacks to the Cleveland
suburb of Parma brought very few inquiries, for example. See supra note 136.
210. In addition to his concern about whether low-income families would be
willing to move to the suburbs, Anthony Downs argued that significant obstacles
stood in the way of providing housing for low-income households in the suburbs.
Downs believed that the cost of suburban housing and community resistance would
make acquiring housing for low-income people difficult. DowNs, supra note 130, at
63-80. As with families' hypothesized reluctance to move, he identified strategies and
incentives designed to overcome resistance to opening up suburban housing. Id. at
132-35, 144. Downs envisioned providing thousands of housing units in suburban
areas through builders setting aside part of their developments for low-income
families. Id. at 112-13. Downs emphasized new construction, consistently with the
thrust of most federal subsidy programs then in existence. However, he also advocated
using a housing allowance to subsidize rents in existing housing, borrowing from the
housing allowance experiment the government carried out in the early 1970s.
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program. Using the private housing market - both the existing stock2 11
and new construction 21 2 - also increased dramatically the housing to
draw on, compared to relying exclusively on the public housing program
21 3
where the case originated.
The Leadership Council's.task was to gain access to as much of
this housing as possible for plaintiff class families, within the limitations of available rent subsidy funds. That required soliciting the
participation of landlords and property managers throughout the
metropolitan area, especially in middle-class, predominantly white
suburbs.
The Leadership Council's strategy took into account the relatively
bifurcated structure of Chicago's real estate industry - with a small
number of very large firms and many small ones. 21 4 The Council
211. Some housing experts had long argued that federal policy should assist lowincome families to secure existing housing, rather than subsidizing new construction,
with the additional costs involved. E.g., IRVING WELFELD, WHERE WE LIVE 225-232
(1988); Irving Welfeld & Joseph Carmel, A New Wave Housing Program:Respecting
the Intelligence of the Poor, 6 URB. LAW. AND POL'Y 293 (1984); Irving Welfeld,
American Housing Policy: PerverseProgramsby PrudentPeople, THE PUB. INTEREST,
Summer, 1977, at 128.
Private housing constituted most of the housing potentially available at any point
in time, including both existing housing and new construction. Even when federally
subsidized construction peaked, in the 1970's, it represented a minority of the housing
construction during that time.
In 1970, subsidized new housing construction accounted for 29.3 percent of all
new housing units started that year. In 1971, subsidized new construction represented
21.2 percent of all new housing starts, and in 1972, 16.3 percent. George Sternlieb &
David Listokin, A Review of National Housing Policy, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR
14, 29 (Peter D. Salins, ed., 1987).
212. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at 40; Letter from Ruth T. Prokop,
then General Counsel of HUD, to Alexander Polikoff (July 29, 1977).
That strategy replicated the arrangements worked out on a voluntary basis with
the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA) even before the inception of the
Gautreaux program. IHDA conditioned its financial assistance to developers on their
setting aside a percentage of their apartments for members of the Gautreaux plaintiff
class. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 7.
213. Suburban public housing was not part of this program, presumably because
of the Supreme Court's admonition that suburban governmental entities were exempt
from coercive remedial measures because they were not implicated in the violation.
See supra p. 604.
However, public housing represented a very small percentage of the suburban
housing supply. In 1980, there were only 4,943 public housing units in the Chicago
suburbs out of a total of 1,328,858 housing units. Thus, the exclusion of suburban
public housing was not very significant. Warren, supra note 102, at 26.
214. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Interview with a Real
Estate expert, in Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Real Estate
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began by meeting with top officials of major management firms to
inform them of the existence of the new program and to encourage
their participation in it.215 Few firms committed themselves to any
significant level of involvement in the program, in spite of ongoing
efforts to recruit them.
Fifteen years after the program began, the-Council tried another
systematic initiative to enlist the industry giants, this time sub-contracting with a real estate management firm for the purpose. 2 6 The
strategy of the second effort was to involve peers of the industry
leaders, who might have more credibility with professionals in the
field than a social agency like the Leadership Council. 217 However,
2I
this approach also produced modest results.
In between those two initiatives, the Leadership Council contacted
large numbers of large and small owners and property managers to
solicit their participation in the program. 219 Also, the Council increasingly emphasized families' taking greater responsibility for their own
search .220 These efforts began to bear fruit, but did not gain access to
dramatically increased amounts of housing for the program. 22'
Thus, while the demand for the Gautreaux program soared, the
amount of housing available to it did not. Although housing became
available at a level that permitted the Gautreaux program to proceed
Expert]. For example, one firm managed over 23,000 rental units in the Chicago
area.
215. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 36-39.
216. In 1991, the Leadership Council sub-contracted with Kirchoff Meadows
Management Corporation to, inter alia, "[c]ontact directors of major rental property
companies and other owners and managers of rental properties to explain the
Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program and encourage participation." Sub-Contract
between Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities and Kirchoff
Meadows Management Corporation, §2. [hereinafter Kirchoff Meadows Sub-Contract].
217. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132. This second effort
included a series of meetings with high level officials of major management firms to
give them in-depth briefings about the program.
218. Id.
219. Id.; Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 37-38.
220. Recently those at the Leadership Council have come to believe that hundreds
of families searching in the market can more effectively find housing than a few
counselors. While in the beginning, uncertainty about the program may have meant
that participants lacked the confidence to do searches, information about the good
experiences of previous families has given participants the energy and knowledge to
conduct searches. At least one family persuaded an on-site manager to accept them,
while the Leadership Council had not been able to persuade top management to join
the program. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
221. Id.
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at a steady pace, no breakthrough occurred as had happened with
families' interest in the program. The parties' intentionally modest
goal of 400 moves for the program's initial year remained beyond the
program's annual reach during its first fifteen years. In fact, while
shortages of funding limit most housing subsidy programs, the Gautreaux program did not even use all of its relatively modest allocation
of Section 8 funds. The shortage of housing accessible to the program
persisted as the primary limiting factor.
That shortage was not attributable to the kind of organized
community resistance that thwarted the scattered site program. Neither
local officials nor citizens' groups played a significant role in the
implementation of the Gautreaux program. Nevertheless, the obstacles
to gaining access to substantial amounts of housing turned out to be
formidable, especially in the suburbs. First, important mismatches
existed between the region's housing supply and the program's goals
and needs. Moreover, affordability problems prevented using a great
deal of otherwise appropriate housing. Most importantly, however,
large numbers of landlords with affordable housing in predominantly
white areas declined to participate in the Gautreaux program, thereby
denying access to plaintiff class families. While metropolitanization
and privatization expanded the housing possibilities, the program's
racial integration goals limited the housing actually accessible.
1. Community Response
In contrast to the experience with the scattered site program, the
Gautreaux program elicited little community response. Local officials
and community groups played little role either in support of, or in
opposition to, the program. Most of the limited organized response
took place in integrated communities concerned about concentrations
222
of Black families and possible resegregation.
222. In Bolingbrook, a racially mixed suburb southwest of Chicago, community
residents objected to what they perceived as a concentration of families moving into
the community through the Gautreaux program. The Leadership Council reassured
the community that relatively few families were moving there through the program,
and that their policy was to disperse families throughout the region. Kale Williams
Interview 3/10/92, supra note 88.
Also, the Oak Park Housing Center, in a racially mixed community on Chicago's
western border, objected to a placement of a family in an integrated building in that
suburb. Once again, the Leadership Council resolved the matter without a significant
confrontation. Id.
Resegregation of neighborhoods and communities occurred in many Chicago
neighborhoods and some southern and western suburbs. See BERRY, supra note 177,
at 255-57; CAROL GOODWIN, THE OAK PARK STRATEGY (1979); Richard H. Sapder,
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Several factors seemed to account for the lack of community
resistance to the Gautreaux program of the kind experienced in its
Chicago counterpart. First, the Section 8 program had a very limited
formal role for public officials, unlike the public housing program.22 3
Suburban city councils did not have to apply for or even approve the
use of Section 8 subsidies in their communities.
Second, the Leadership Council worked for several years through
the Regional Housing Coalition with a group of suburban mayors,
promoting affordable housing in the suburbs. Several of those mayors
sent a letter to other mayors in the region explaining the Gautreaux
program, reassuring them that families would be dispersed, and urging

their support for

it.224

Both these efforts may have muted possible

opposition to the program.
Perhaps more importantly, the Gautreaux program had very little
visibility. The scale of the program was modest. Participants, as the
mayors had indicated, were widely scattered across many communities
- far more scattered than in the scattered site program in the city.
Families moved to privately owned rental housing, their participation
kept confidential from all but their landlords. 225 No construction took
place specifically for this program, and no public announcements
preceeded families' moves to a community, unlike in the scattered site
program. Finally, middle-class communities a long distance from
Black areas had little reason to anticipate significant Black in-migration across the physical and economic distance from the inner city. A
much larger program would probably have elicited substantial resistance; but absent overt community response, the private housing
market determined the program's fate.
2.

Supply: The Existing Housing Stock and New Construction

During the period of the public housing "boom" of the late
1950s and 1960s, private suburban apartment construction "boomed"
Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 874 (1988). In a number of suburbs, local officials and community
activists have organized "integration maintenance" activities to keep their communities racially mixed and prevent resegregation. See Alexander Polikoff, Sustainable
Integration or Inevitable Resegregation: The Troubling Question, in HousiNG DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 43 (John M. Goering, ed. 1986); John Schrag &
Jorge Casuso, A Delicate Balance: "Open" Suburbs Fight to Avoid Racial "Tipping," THE Cm. REPORTER, Dec. 1985, at I.
223. See supra p. 596.
224. Letter from Jack Pahl, Chairman, Mayors' Steering Committee to All
Mayors, Village Presidents and County Board Presidents in the Chicago Region
(Aug. 10, 1976) (on file with author).
225. See DowNs, supra note 130, at 134-35.
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in the Chicago area as well as nationally. 226 The homogeneity of the
single-family home suburbs made way for more diverse development
227
patterns, opening many suburbs to renters as well as home owners.
Rental accommodations ranging from two-flats to large-scale developments accompanied by substantial recreational and community
facilities dotted the suburban landscape.228 As a result, substantial
numbers of rental units were potentially available in Chicago's suburbs
to families in the Gautreaux program. 229 In fact, developers had
already built subsidized rental housing in a number of those communities. 23 0
However, much of the vast rental housing supply in the Chicago
metropolitan area did not fit the needs of the Gautreaux program.
The focus on moves to predominantly white areas substantially reduced the portion of the region's housing potentially available to the
program. It de-emphasized, but did not exclude entirely, the very
large portions of the city and the smaller parts of the suburbs where
many Blacks lived. 23' In so doing, it avoided many areas where housing
226. Richard F. Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the
Apartment Boom, 11 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1963). 29.8 percent of all dwelling units
(8,919 out of 29,914) constructed in Chicago suburban areas in 1961 were multifamily. Id. at 1051 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
CONSTRUCTION REPORTS, BUILDING PERMITS TABLES 1-2 (C40 ser., No. 38, July 1962)).

Even more permits (11,371) for multi-family dwellings were issued in 1962 for the
Chicago suburbs. Id. at 1052 (citing Bell Savings and Loan Ass'n, Survey of New
Building, Chicago Metropolitan Area (Jan. 15, 1963)).
227. MAYER & WADE, supra note 146, at 416-24.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of subsidized units (including new
construction and rehabilitation under a number of programs and Section 8 existing
housing) increased by over 24,000 in the Chicago suburbs. Warren, supra note 102,
at 19.
231. The Leadership Council tried to avoid contributing to what it considered
to be concentrations of Black families. Independently of the Gautreaux program, the
Leadership Council worked closely with suburban officials and organizations seeking
to maintain racial integration in communities where it existed and to avoid resegregation. To that end, the Leadership Council imposed moratoria on Gautreaux
placements in certain suburbs or parts of them. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92,
supra note 88; Mary Davis, Associate Director of the Leadership Council, Presentation Given at the Housing Desegregation Remedies Conference (Feb. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter, Mary Davis at the Desegregation Conference]. The Leadership Council
informed registrants about these locational restrictions through brochures and briefing
sessions.
The Seventh Circuit held that integration maintenance efforts by one Chicago
area fair housing organization through an affirmative marketing plan did not violate
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would have been readily available to the program. 23 2 Much of the
housing in 'areas where significant numbers of Black families lived
was more affordable, and many landlords there accepted Section 8
tenants.

23 a

The Gautreaux program's dispersal policy meant that even within
predominantly white areas, some portions of communities, neighborhoods, developments, and buildings were off limits to the program,
or the number of families permitted to move to those locations was
very limited.2 14 Program designers and administrators excluded from
the program much of the region's housing that would have been most
readily accessible to these families, in order to achieve and maintain
what they deemed to be an undue
racial integration and prevent 235
families.
Black
of
concentration
The necessary reliance on rental housing excluded housing available for purchase only, such as most condominiums and almost all
single-family homes. That amounted to a great deal of the region's
communities or sections of them with only
housing, including entire
23 6
purchase.
for
housing
In addition, the private rental stock contained few accommodations for large families. 23 7 Many plaintiff class families required three,
four, or five bedrooms; but few such apartments were available,
especially in the suburbs. 23 While some owners of single-family homes
did rent their houses to families in the Gautreaux program, the market

the Fair Housing Act. South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Board. of Realtors, 935 F.2d
868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
232. See supra note 151.
233. Many landlords in the regular, non-Gautreaux, Section 8 programs in the
region were in predominantly Black or integrated areas. Warren, supra note 102, at
29-31.
234. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88.
235. Id.; Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130. The original
agreement provided tentative goals for general distribution of families among the six
counties of the Chicago Metropolitan area and stated an intention to locate families
"in a dispersed fashion" within each county. Letter of Agreement, supra note 87, at
40. The Leadership Council's contracts with HUD for the administration of the
program specified that it would take steps to prevent concentration of participating
families.
236. Kale Williams identified lack of rental housing stock as one of several
reasons why families did not move to certain communities. Kale Williams Interview,
3/10/92, supra note 88.
237. PEROFF ET AL., supra note 131, at 46-47.
238. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 91-92, 103; Kale Williams Interview,
2/24/92, supra note 132; Mary Davis at Desegregation Conference, supra note 231.
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in general could not accommodate larger families seeking to partici-

pate. 239
HUD required rental housing developers it assisted to set aside a
percentage of their apartments for Gautreaux families. 214 During the
late 1970s and early 1980s, these set-asides served as an important
source of housing for the program. 241However, during the 1980s, the
federal government cut the funding for those construction programs
drastically.2 2 Consequently, by the early 1990s, set-asides for the
Gautreaux program provided only a trickle of apartments.243
3. Affordability: Market Rents and Section 8 Subsidies
Although the Gautreaux program relied on the private housing

market, low-income families' gaining access to that housing required

public subsidies. Without the Section 8 rent subsidies, most of the

rental housing in predominantly white areas was beyond the means
of plaintiff class families. 244 Consistent with Section 8 requirements,
the Gautreaux program used only housing with actual rents within
federally established ceilings - or "fair market rents." The combination of relatively high rents in much of the region's private housing
and HUD's administration of the Section 8's "fair market rent"

provisions limited substantially the housing potentially available to

239. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88; PEROFF ET AL., supra note
131, at 46-47. Historically, the private market served large, low-income Black families
least well. For a time after World War II, the public housing program filled this gap
reasonably well. Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview,
in Tn LAW OF THE POOR 318 (Jacobus tenBroek, ed., 1966). The Gautreaux program,

with its privatization approach, also had its greatest difficulty accommodating large
families.
240. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 677. Even when federal funding
was available, suburban land use controls limited places where developers could build
HUD-assisted housing. ADVISORY COMM'N. ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE
Hous., U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., NOT IN MY BACK YARD 2-1 to 2-14

(1991) [hereinafter
Hous.].

ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE

241. See infra pp. 666-68.
242. Starts of subsidized new construction units peaked in 1971 at 441,000, then
slowed during the mid-seventies, but increased again by the late seventies (237,000
starts in 1979). However, funding cuts beginning in 1981 caused a rapid decline of
subsidized housing production, resulting in only 70,000 starts in 1985. Sternlieb &
Listokin, supra note 211, at 29.
243. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88.
244. SQUIRES ET A., supra note 146, at 106; PEROFF ET A., supra note 131, at
43-47.
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the Gautreaux program at various times and in various parts of the
metropolitan area.2 5
Market forces and land use controls largely determined rents in
private housing - both the existing stock and new construction.
Developers traditionally built rental housing for relatively affluent
tenants, and landlords attempted to attract those kinds of households
to their buildings. The private market did not serve low-income tenants
well, which was part of the reason Congress created the public housing
program in the 1930s and other subsidy programs in the half century
since then. 24 At the same time, local land use controls added substantially to the cost of housing - because of both substantive and
procedural requirements .47 The Supreme Court in Gautreaux indicated that the lower courts would not interfere with the operation of
those local prerogatives,248 so the remedial program accepted market
rents for new construction as well as existing housing as a given.249
Although the suburban rental supply was substantial and growing
when the Gautreaux program came along, much of the housing was
too expensive to be available to the program. Sections of communities
or entire communities remained beyond the financial reach of the
program. While the suburbs' heterogeneity meant that some rents
were relatively modest, much of the stock presented affordability
problems.
The amount of housing affordable to the program depended not
250
only on the actual rents, but also on HUD's "fair market rents.
245. One Chicago real estate expert identified fair market rents as the Gautreaux
program's major constraint. Interview with a Real Estate Expert, supra note 214.
246. See Friedman, supra note 239, on the history of public housing and the
effort not to compete with the private housing market.
247. ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS

TO AFFORDABLE Hous.,

supra

note 240, at 2-1 to 2-14; Barbara Baran, Illinois Annexation Agreements - Are We
Behind the Times?, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 727 (1992).
Suburban governments played an important but subtle role in affecting the
supply of housing affordable to the Gautreaux program. Zoning and other regulatory

devices influenced the type and amount of housing, e.g., multi-family v. singlefamily, numbers of bedrooms permitted, and amenities required. Local policies and
practices thus shaped the housing supply that was potentially available for the
Gautreaux program.
248. See supra p. 604.
249. In 1991, a HUD Commission addressed the shortage of affordable housing
and urged the removal of regulatory barriers that unduly increased the cost of new
housing. ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE Hous., supra
note 240, at 6-1 to 6-5. Changes of that kind would reduce the cost of housing and
increase the amount of housing within fair market rents, unless HUD reduced fair
market rents accordingly.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (1988).
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The fair market rent concept represented a Congressional compromise
between providing low-income families access to decent housing in
the private market and keeping the subsidy costs per family reasonable. 2 ' Keeping subsidy costs per family down enabled HUD to spread
these scarce resources across a larger number of eligible families.2 2
Also, Congress did not want poor people to have better accommo-,
dations than middle-class households. 253 Consequently, applying fair
market rents inevitably excluded a substantial portion of the area's
pool of rental units from the Gautreaux program.
However, HUD exercised its discretion in administering fair
market rents in several ways that further reduced the rental units
within the Gautreaux program's financial reach. HUD sometimes
established fair market rent levels that did not accurately reflect
private market rents. 25 4 The agency also moved slowly in making
changes that reflected increases in market rents, as well as permitting
use of higher "exception" rent levels under certain circumstances. 5
When HUD made needed changes in fair market rents, more apartments became available and the numbers of moves increased. 26
In addition, fair market rents often did not adequately reflect
the widely varying market conditions in different parts of the Chicago
region.257 This particularly impeded moves to more affluent areas of
the region where actual rents often exceeded HUD's fair market rents,
such as DuPage County and northwest Cook County. 258 HUD's delays
or failure to make sub-regional adjustments significantly hampered
use of the program in those areas. 2 9 Once again, when HUD made
251. BARRY JACOBS ET AL., GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 27-28 (1982).
252. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING,

140-41

(1985).
253. Doing so would raise equity questions as well as having possible political
implications, potentially undermining support for the program. Id. at 159-60, 16771.
254. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 7; Interview with Real Estate Expert,

supra note 214; Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
255. Congress provided for such exceptions in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (1988);
24 C.F.R. § 882.106 (1991).
256. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 7; Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/

92, supra note 132.
257. HUD can establish sub-regional fair market rents to reflect differing market
rents within regions. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (1988); 24 C.F.R. § 888.113 (1991).
258. By the early 1990s, HUD permitted higher ceilings for northwest Cook
County, thus facilitating expanded access there; but the DuPage County fair market
rents remained problematic and few families moved there. Kale Williams Interview,
2/24/92, supra note 132; Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130.
259. Also, DuPage County's own Section 8 program absorbed most of the rental
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sub-regional adjustments, as in the rapidly developing northwest Cook
County, additional housing became available to the program, and
more families moved there.
4.

Accessibility: Landlord Participation

Increasing fair market rents did not ensure that landlords whose
had become affordable to the program would participate in
housing
it.26° Implementing the Gautreaux program depended on the willingness of housing owners and property managers in predominantly
white, middle-class areas to accept participating families as tenants.
Developers and building owners receiving other HUD assistance were
obligated to participate through the "set-aside" arrangements the
parties negotiated. 26' But the vast majority of landlords had the choice
of whether to become involved in the Gautreaux program.
Those landlords' decisions depended on their assessment of the
benefits and costs of renting to plaintiff class families, being involved
in the Section 8 program, and working with the Leadership Council
as it administered the Gautreaux program. Overall, large numbers of
landlords either declined to participate at all, or they accepted a very
small number of tenants through the program. Assessments of landlords' motivations must necessarily be tentative, in light of the complexities of the context and the absence of systematic data on this

sensitive subject. 262
a.

The Tenants

Most landlords in predominantly white outlying areas were accustomed to having white middle-class families, often with two parunits that were within the fair market rents. The county's housing authority did not

request an increase in fair market rents, as HUD's procedures called for, so HUD
took no action in this regard. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.

260. In fact, landlords with higher rents might have been less likely to accept
low-income families than those whose units were already within the fair market rents,
because of the wide disparities between the incomes of their market rate tenants and
those of Gautreaux participants.

261. See supra p. 619.

262. It is impossible to determine the precise mixture of factors motivating
landlords' decisions. Many possible explanations existed, with various combinations
and interactions among them. Conclusions about motivations must be very tentative,

because of the limited amount of direct evidence and reliance instead on impressions

from program administrators and participants, assessments by real estate experts,
general data on Chicago area housing discrimination by race, income, and family
size, and inferences from the normal operation of the housing market.
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ents, as tenants. Participating in the Gautreaux program meant
accepting low-income Blacks from Chicago, mostly single-parent families who lived in public housing - a drastic departure from their
customary practice. Any one of these characteristics would have been
sufficient to deter many landlords. Cumulatively, they provided large
numbers of landlords a rationale for saying no to the Gautreaux
program - even if they rarely articulated those reasons.2 6 The
tenants' attributes were probably the decisive factor for many land2
lords who opted out of the Gautreaux program. 6

Race was almost certainly a consideration in many landlords'
decisions about whether to participate in the Gautreaux program. 26
With rare exceptions, landlords and their management staff did not
acknowledge any racially discriminatory motivation.M However, the
Chicago area's documented patterns of housing discrimination and
racial segregation suggested that the overt incidents constituted only
the tip of the iceberg. 267 Many landlords probably avoided the Gautreaux program at least in part because the prospective tenants were
Black, even though doing so violated federal and state law and local
2
ordinances in many communities. 6
However, it was difficult to determine when racial motivations
operated, especially because of the existence of other plausible explanations for landlords opting out of the Gautreaux program.26 9 For
263. Interview with Real Estate Expert, supra note 214.

264. One real estate expert reported that some landlords avoided the Section 8

program entirely because they feared that participating in the Section 8 program
might require them to accept tenants through the Gautreaux program. Kale Williams
Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88; Interview with Real Estate Expert, supra note
214.
265. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88; Interview with Real Estate

Expert, supra note 214.
266. Several management staff persons expressed their reluctance to accept Black
tenants. See Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 94.

267. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HOuS. AND URB.
DEv., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS (1991); Williams, supra note 175;

Fossett & Orfield, supra note 175, at 173-77.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988); Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII) 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1988); Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-102 (1991);
Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 5-8-020 (1990).
269. Discrimination may have been so subtle that Leadership Council staff or
plaintiff class families were not even aware of it. See note 271 infra for a discussion
of the difficulties even trained trained testers can have in determining whether they
were receiving different treatment because of their race. The Leadership Council's
legal action program had been discovering and challenging racial discrimination in
housing since the late 1960s. BERRY, supra note 177; Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/
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example, some may have avoided the Gautreaux program because it
required involving themselves with the Section 8 program.27 At the
same time, those justifications could easily serve as a pretext for racial

discrimination.27 ' With so many factors besides race potentially at
work, motives were often mixed and difficult to separate out, concep-

tually and practically. 272 Moreover, landlords did not have to provide
92, supra note 132. The Council relied heavily on "testing" and "audits" to discover
racial discrimination - sending comparable Black and white "homeseekers" to the
same developments or real estate offices, to determine whether they received different
treatment that they could attribute to racial discrimination. At the same time, the
Leadership Council worked cooperatively with the real estate industry to educate its
members about their responsibilities under fair housing laws. That dual role always
required the agency to walk a tightrope, explaining to industry members hat they
simply served as lawyers for clients in discrimination cases.
The Council's dual role was particularly problematic in the context of the
Gautreaux program, because the program depended so heavily on landlords' voluntary
participation. Any Leadership Council investigation or lawsuit related to the Gautreaux program could have endangered carefully cultivated relationships with that
landlord, and risked alienating others as well. One major landlord expressed reluctance to participate in the program while a discrimination lawsuit was pending, where
the Leadership Council was counsel for the plaintiff. That landlord ultimately agreed
to participate; but its level of participation may have been affected by the dilemma
of maintaining both cooperative and adversarial relationships simultaneously. On the
other hand, the Leadership Council cited an example of a management firm agreeing
to accept a specific number of families through the Gautreaux program as part of a
settlement of a case against it. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
270. See supra notes 287-97 and accompanying text. On the other hand, willingness to participate in the Section 8 program, but not the Gautreaux program, might
have indicated racial animus.
Moreover, a number of courts have concluded that violation of the Federal Fair
Housing Act can occur based on discriminatory effect or impact, without racial
motivation. In the context of the Gautreaux program, refusal to accept tenants
through the Gautreaux program excluded a group that was exclusively Black. Any
decision to accept Section 8 tenants but not Gautreaux families probably had a
substantial disparate impact. See Frederic S. Schwartz, The DisparateImpact Theory
of Discrimination in Employment and Housing: The Limits of Analogy, 59 UMKC

L.

REV.

815 (1991).

271. Even those who are experienced at detecting racial discrimination cannot
always discern the subtle forms of discrimination. Two of the Leadership Council's
professional "testers" - one Black and one white - participated in an experiment
in cooperation with the network television show "Prime Time." They went to St.
Louis for two weeks, and each went to the same places - employment agencies,
apartment buildings, car dealers, stores, etc. The show videotaped their experiences
with hidden cameras and found greater differences in treatment than either of them
would have realized without the graphic comparison provided by the television
cameras. Prime Time: True Colors (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1991).
272. For example, some landlords might have accepted middle-class Black
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any explanation at all for not participating, because the program was
273
entirely voluntary.
The combination of families' being Black and coming from the
inner city - especially public housing -

tapped into many landlords'

stereotypes. 274 They stigmatized those families and feared that gangs,
drugs, and violence would accompany them.
At the same time that the Leadership Council, its sub-contractor,

and participating families were spreading the word about the Gautreaux program, the media and informal networks spread information
about it.275 The media reports that informed families about the
program probably reached landlords as well, while some landlords
may also have seen the coverage of the program in elite magazines. 276
As more families moved, additional information about those
experiences became available. This was important because of the lack
of experience in the United States with racial and economic integration.2 77 Landlords received varying reports about those experiences
from different sources. The Leadership Council and the media reported quite positive experiences. However, landlords' informal networks conveyed less positive and more critical information about the
program. As a result, many landlords remained skeptical about the
Gautreaux program.278
"Horror stories" about suburban landlords' experiences with
Gautreaux tenants - such as damage to the apartments and nonpayment of rent - added to these concerns, although it is not clear
how much landlords' grapevines may have embellished these incitenants, but would not rent to low-income Black families. Or they might have

accepted low-income whites but not low-income Blacks - especially families from
public housing. The latter would have been illegal, but very difficult to detect through
testing, because neither low-income Blacks or whites could afford housing the
Gautreaux program used unless they had Section 8 certificates, which might only be
available to the Black families participating in the Gautreaux program.
273. Landlords sometimes agreed to take only one or two families through the
program. Their motivation for this limitation might have been racial; but that would
have been even more difficult to prove in light of their accepting one or more Black
tenants.
274. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Interview with Real
Estate Expert, supra note 214; Mary Davis at Desegregation Conference, supra note
231.
275. See supra pp. 622-23.
276. See supra note 151.
277. Irving Welfeld, The Courts and Desegregated Housing: The Meaning (if
any) of the Gautreaux Case, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 128-29 (Fall, 1976).
278. Interview with Real Estate Expert, supra note 214.
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dents. 279 These stories may have had an impact out of proportion to
their frequency or severity because they reinforced many landlords'
preconceptions about inner city Black families.
In addition to race, class, and place of origin, family composition
was probably a factor in landlords' decisions - the presence of
children and the absence of fathers. Most of the participants in the
Gautreaux program were single-parent families, composed of a woman
2
and her children.

80

Landlords' resistance to Gautreaux families based on their race,
place of origin, family composition, income, or some constellation of
these characteristics may have been a matter of personal taste or
based on economic considerations. The financial considerations could
have included concerns about direct costs, such as damage to apart28
ments or non-payment of rent. '

279. No systematic comparison exists of landlords' experiences with tenants
from the Gautreaux program and non-Gautreaux households. Informal networks
may have badly distorted the incidents in the Gautreaux program, and may have
even mistakenly attributed problems to families in the program. In light of many
landlords' preconceptions, this risk was particularly serious. However, since the
program was voluntary, landlords had little incentive to obtain systematic information
about other landlords' experiences with families in the Gautreaux program. To convey
positive experiences and to counter any distortions that might circulate among
landlords, the Leadership Council requested satisfied participating landlords to spread
the word about their experience.
280. One study found that 58 percent of families with children experienced
discrimination while searching for housing in Chicago in spite of federal and state
laws prohibiting such discrimination. The study was limited to the city, but such
discrimination probably existed in the suburbs as well, especially when the families
were single-parent, low-income Black ones. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous.,
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METRO. OPEN COMMUNITIES & METRO. TENANTS ORG., No
CHILDREN ALLOWED: A REPORT OF THE OBSTACLES FACED BY RENTERS WITH CHILDREN

IN THE CHICAGO RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 18 (1991); Illinois Human Rights Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-102 (1991); Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII) 42

U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).

281. Even though tenants would have been liable for repair costs beyond normal
wear and tear, landlords wanted to avoid the disputes that might occur about
responsibility. Moreover, landlords were concerned that low-income tenants might
not have the resources to pay for repairs for which they were liable.
One study revealed that landlords believe that maintaining Section 8 rental units
is more expensive than typical market rental units, either because of the strict and
continuous enforcement of quality standards or because Section 8 tenants more often
damage the units. If the fair market rents do not appear to compensate for these
increased costs (real or perceived), many landlords will not participate in Section 8.

Michael A. Quinn, Financial Tradeoffs and Landlord Participationin the Section 8
Rental Assistance Program, AM. PLANNING Ass'N J., Winter 1986, at 33, 38-41.
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Landlords may also have been concerned about the impact of
the presence of these families on other tenants - both present and
prospective. For example, landlords might have been concerned about
middle-class white tenants' biases, or clashes of cultures and lifestyle
between Gautreaux families and market-rate tenants - such as different choices in type and volume of music, cars or other sounds and
sights that might risk retention of middle-income tenants or endanger

the development's marketability .282

A typical landlord response was that Gautreaux families were
"nothing but trouble. ' 28 a That reaction summed up many landlords'
personal preferences as well as their assessment of the practical
implications of renting to families in the Gautreaux program. In
considering the potential impact of Gautreaux families on marketability, landlords tried to discern' and reflect community attitudes. 28
Residents of many predominantly white suburban communities objected to Black families moving in, especially from the inner city of
Chicago. 2 5 An extreme example of this phenomenon was that in a
few notoriously racially exclusionary communities, no landlords agreed
286
to participate in the Gautreaux program.
[iw2]
Those landlords in middle-class white suburbs who were
interested in the Section 8 program probably preferred tenants from
the suburbs, who were more likely to be white, two-parent families
with somewhat higher income than the families in the Gautreaux
program. 2 7 Suburban Section 8 residents and families in the Gautreaux program competed for the same housing. In addition to greater
landlord receptivity to them, suburbanites had an advantage in the
282. Part of what suburban landlords offered prospective tenants may have been
homogeneity - other tenants who were like them in lifestyle and social class.
283. Interview with Real Estate Expert #2, Chicago, Ill.
(Apr. 9, 1992).
284. This led many landlords to participate initially on a very limited basis,
accepting a family or two in a large development. This provided an opportunity to
observe the impact of the tenants' presence. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at
92-93.
285. See supra pp. 634-37.
286. For example, in Cicero, a virtually all-white working class suburb bordering
on Chicago of more than 60,000 people, it took fifteen years before the first landlord
agreed to accept a family through the program. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92,
supra note 88. See supra page 637 for discussion of why the family did not make
this move.
287. For example, most Section 8 applicants from DuPage County were able to
secure housing there, while few families in the Gautreaux program succeeded in their
searches in that area. Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130; Kale
WIlliams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
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search process because of their greater familiarity with the housing
288
market in their area.
b.

The Section 8 Program

In addition to deciding whether they wanted to rent to families
like those in the Gautreaux program, landlords had to decide whether
the benefits outweighed the costs of participating in the Section 8
program. Section 8 subsidies provided landlords a major portion of
the rent each month - the part of the market rent that exceeded the
tenant's share. The program also provided the possibility of a stable
stream of revenue. HUD guaranteed funding for five year terms, with
the likelihood of two term extensions. 2 9 If the landlord and tenant
period, the subsidy would be
renewed their lease through the funded
29
available for up to fifteen years. 0
Like other so-called privatization efforts, the public sector retained a significant role in the Section 8 program. Along with the
financial benefits, the Section 8 program imposed substantive and
procedural requirements on landlords. For example, dwelling units
had to meet federal quality standards. 29' In addition, in 1987, Congress
prohibited landlords who accepted any Section 8 tenants from discriminating against other Section 8 applicants. 292 Many landlords viewed
this provision as intruding inappropriately on their discretion in
selecting tenants. 293 Suburban landlords expressed concerns that if

AL.,

288. Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(2)(A) (1988); 24 C.F.R. § 882.107 (1991); JACOBS ET
supra note 251, at 45.
290. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 251, at 45. See, e.g., QUINN, supra note 281, at

33. The importance of these subsidies to the tenants increased their incentives to
maintain good relationships with landlords. That, in turn, made the program more

attractive to landlords.

291. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 882.109 (1991). This requirement did
not generally impose significant costs on landlords in middle-class suburbs, because
the market required that they maintain relatively high standards anyway.
292. The statute provides that:
No owner who has entered into a contract for housing assistance payments
under this section on behalf of any tenant in a multifamily housing project

shall refuse (A)to lease any available unit in any multifamily housing project
of such owner that rents for an amount not greater than the fair market
rent ... to a holder of a certificate . . . a proximate cause of which is the
status of such prospective tenant as a holder of such certificate ....

42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) (1988).
293. The provision applied to owners of buildings with five units or more. 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(t). Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88; Interview with
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they accepted one Section 8 tenant many more such families would

follow, and they would not be able to limit access of low-income
families. 294 This "floodgates"

issue led some landlords to avoid the

program. Section 8 requirements also included procedures for land-

lords to follow. Perhaps most significantly, evictions required adher295
ence to HUD-specified procedures.

In cooperation with HUD, local public housing authorities ad-

ministered important aspects of the Section 8 program. Landlords
had to depend on local housing officials' timely payment of monthly
rent subsidies. The delays that some Chicago area landlords experienced in receiving those checks imposed significant burdens on them,
particularly on smaller landlords, and further deterred them from
2
participating in the Section 8 program. 9
Finally, some landlords stayed away from all government programs as a matter of principle - often mixed with practical concerns
about bureaucratic complexities inherent in such programs. In spite
of extensive federal, state, and local intervention in the housing
market, many private owners and managers jealously guarded their
private prerogatives and avoided involvement with government when297
ever possible.
c.

Gautreaux Program Incentives
Faced with owners' and property managers' skepticism, the Gautreaux program included several elements designed to encourage landReal Estate Expert, supra note 214.
A district court in New York held that there was a private right of action to
enforce this provision. Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 746 F.
Supp. 301, 308-09 (S.D. N.Y. 1990).
294. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note 88; Interview with Real Estate
Expert, supra note 214. Anthony Downs claimed that middle class families would
flee an area if they were not assured that the number of low-income families would
be limited. DowNs, supra note 130, at 99.
295. The owner may not evict a Section 8 tenant without filing a court action.
24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1991). And the owner cannot terminate the tenancy except for
serious violation of the terms of the lease, or for violation of the law, or for "other
good cause." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1988). HUD regulations provide several
examples of reasons that are and are not "good cause." 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1991).
Within 90 days of any termination, the landlord must submit a written notice to
HUD and the tenant, so that HUD can determine the legality of the termination, or
take steps to avoid it. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9) (1988).
296. Mary Davis at Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130. Chicago landlords
complained that CHA often failed to make the first payment until six weeks after
the tenant arrived. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132. However, this
did not seem to be as important a factor in landlords' participation decisions as
others, especially in the suburbs.
297. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
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lord participation, in addition to the Section 8 subsidies. The Leadership
Council took steps to reduce landlords' costs and risks. The Council
screened applicant families to ensure that they would meet landlords'
criteria and standards. 29 It obtained credit checks, made home visits,29
and required families to get letters of reference.? ° This saved landlords
screening costs and reduced the risks of landlords incurring various
298. The Leadership Council considered its approach a pragmatic one. Landlord
participation was purely voluntary. Landlords' concerns about the quality of tenants
presented an important obstacle to their involvement in the program. The Leadership
Council attempted to respond to those concerns by trying to ensure that tenants
would meet landlords' requirements. Doing so provided an additional incentive for
participation by saving landlords some of the cost of doing their own regular
screening. In fact, Leadership Council staff objected to the use of the term "screening" both because they did not exclude anyone from the program - rather they
deferred them for counselling - and because they believed they were simply mirroring
what the landlords would have done anyway.
When problems surfaced in the initial screening, the Leadership Council counselled families, in order to resolve these matters and permit them to move later. Mary
Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 3.
The Leadership Council's screening received a variety of criticisms. Some argued
that the Council should not screen at all because it: (1) treated plaintiff class families
differently from each other, even though all of them were equally entitled to relief
in the case; (2) legitimated landlords' class or cultural biases; (3) legitimated the idea
that some families were deserving of these housing opportunities and others were
not; and (4) "skimmed" or "creamed," thus artificially improving the chances for
success of the program, while at the same time drawing important human resources
away from the inner city, where the needs were so great.
On the other hand, Sue Brady, the Director of the Housing Resource Center of
Hull House and the manager of much of CHA's scattered site housing, claimed that
"screening" was the key to the viability of scattered site public housing in Chicago.
She argued that responsible, conscientious tenants were necessary for that program
to work. HOusING THAT WORKS (promotional video produced by Video Services for
the Habitat Company 1990); see also, Hank DeZutter, Public Housing that Works
(1986) (paper prepared for Business and Professional People for the Public Interest,
on file with author).
Although the rhetoric about "screening" was different, both the Leadership
Council and the Housing Resource Center seemed to point to the standards of
acceptable tenants in the private housing market as the appropriate measure. In fact,
the Leadership Council's burden in this regard was greater because it had to recruit
private landlords into the program on a voluntary basis and ensure that the experience
was sufficiently satisfactory that they would remain in the program.
299. The home visits enabled Leadership Council staff to assess families' housekeeping and also to confirm the number of people in the household, to ensure
consistency with HUD regulations and landlords' expectations about the size of the
family. Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 2, at 55; Mary Davis Paper, supra note
135, at 3. If more people moved into the unit than were listed on the lease, there
was a possibility of fraud and eviction.
300. This step exceeded what landlords normally did.
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costs associated with problem tenants.30' The screening procedures
persuaded some landlords to participate in the program. Others
decided either that this screening was not sufficiently rigorous, or that
they simply did not want families from this program as tenants.30 2
In addition to screening families, the Leadership Council also
counseled them, individually and in groups, about the nature of the
program, the housing search process, landlords' expectations, and
their responsibilities as tenants. As the program evolved, the Leadership Council intensified the training in the search process and assigned
families more of the responsibility for finding their own housing. 03
As families invested more in the search and gained confidence in their
abilities, landlords evaluated them more positively. °4 Consequently,
families were increasingly effective in "selling" the program and
themselves as prospective tenants to landlords.3 5
As the Leadership Council found that training families to conduct
their own search brought more landlords into the program, it requested additional HUD funding for this purpose. 3°6 Intensive counseling of families not only added to the demand for the program;
but, importantly, it increased the amount of housing available to it
as well.
As an additional incentive for participation, the Leadership Council assured landlords of confidentiality. The Council would not make
public which landlords were involved with the program, or the fact
that the program was part of a remedy in a public housing desegregation lawsuit. Other tenants and community residents obviously knew
that the landlord had rented to a Black family, but they would not
know about the program or the lawsuit.
And the Leadership Council's policy of dispersing families could
reassure landlords who were concerned about concentrations of lowincome Black families in their developments. Minimizing the visibility
301. This also reduced the likelihood of major repair costs, eviction procedures,
or loss of other tenants because of objections to these tenants.
302. Interview with Real Estate Expert, supra note 214.

303. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Mary Davis Paper, supra
note 135, at 3.

304. Families could also discover and contact far more small landlords than the

Leadership Council could do, with its limited staff.
305. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Mary Davis Paper, supra
note 135, at 3.
306. In 1992, the Leadership Council requested HUD to permit it to add to the
counseling staff, because the agency believed that this would produce more housing
for the program. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Mary Davis at
Gautreaux Seminar, supra note 130.
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of the program and dispersing families addressed landlords' concerns
that accepting Gautreaux families would affect their ability to retain
their other tenants and fill future vacancies promptly.
Overall, then, the Leadership Council tried to enlist landlords by
reducing their costs and their risks. Screening prospective tenants
saved landlords money at the outset, and reduced risks that tenants
would cause problems for the landlords later. The dispersal policy
minimized the visibility of the program to other tenants and the
community, while also reassuring landlords that the Leadership Council would not request that they accept many families.
On the other hand, these strategies revealed the self-limiting
nature of the program.3 °7 Too much visibility could lead to greater
community resistance, which could decrease landlords' willingness to
participate. This dilemma helped to explain why no breakthrough
occurred in the housing available to the program.
With these benefits and costs of participating in the Gautreaux
program - the tenants, the Section 8 requirements, and the Leadership Council's incentives - landlords in predominantly white, middleclass communities, found the program most appealing when the rental
market was "soft," either generally or in particular areas. Placements
went up accordingly. Thus, vacancy rates seemed to be a crucial
variable. 3 °8 If developers had overbuilt or there was a decline in the
rental housing market and landlords could not attract enough market
rate tenants to fill their buildings or developments, Gautreaux families
became an attractive additional market and a means of avoiding
39
excessive and extended vacancies .
Some small landlords in predominantly white areas found the
program's financial arrangements attractive and accepted Section 8
tenants, including those from the Gautreaux program. And some
individual investors purchased single-family homes for the purpose of
renting them to Section 8 tenants, thereby providing most of the few
310
opportunities for large families to receive these subsidies.
307. Mary Davis Paper, supra note 135, at 7.

308. Id. at 7. In a somewhat analogous situation, a study of private hospitals
found the percentage of vacant beds was the major determinant of their decisions
whether to perform abortions. Private hospitals -

even those with no religious

affiliation - tended not to perform abortions, presumably because of their concern

about other patients staying away because they objected to the hospital's abortion
policy. Kathleen A. Kemp et al., The Supreme Court and Social Change: The Case
of Abortion, 31 W. POL. Q. 19 (1978); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

195-201 (1991).

309. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
310. Once again, there was an analogy to the abortion context, where the private
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Also, several landlords participated in the Gautreaux program

because they wanted to enable low-income Black families to move to
predominantly white, middle-class communities.3

In the early stages

of the Gautreaux program, the Leadership Council sought out landlords and property managers who shared the program's goals and

joined for reasons of principle, as well as for the financial benefits." 2
Some of those landlords tried to persuade others to follow suit.3" 3
Their success in doing so depended largely on the state of the market
at the particular time and in the particular place.
At the same time, most of the large real estate firms indicated
reluctance to participate in the Gautreaux program. 3 4 Marketability
concerns loomed large, because of their fear of alienating and losing
existing tenants and failing to attract additional tenants. 315
d.

Set-Asides

In addition to families gaining access to existing housing through

the Gautreaux program, the Section 8 set-asides in HUD-assisted new
31 6
construction provided another source of housing for the program.
Private developers who received HUD assistance were obligated to
accept families in the program, unlike landlords of existing housing.
In order to prevent concentration of these families, however, setasides were limited to a small percentage of a development's apartments. 31 7 Once again, there was a trade-off between the program's
market responded to Roe v. Wade by the creation of specialized abortion clinics.
ROSENBERG, supra note 308,

at 195-201.

311. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
312. Id.
313. Interview with Real Estate Expert, supra note 214.
314. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132; Interview with Real
Estate Expert, supra note 214.
315. One of the largest management firms in the area agreed to participate in
the Gautreaux program in the early days as part of a settlement in a racial
discrimination case against it. However, the firm dropped out of the program after
the murder of a Black person near one of its developments where a family in the
Gautreaux program lived. The family was not implicated in the murder; but the real
estate firm's concern about adverse publicity - presumably because the family and
the murder victim were both Black - led it to leave the Gautreaux program for a
number of years. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra note 132.
316. The set-aside provisions also applied to other HUD-assisted programs in
the region; but the new construction programs provided the bulk of the units under
the set-aside provisions.
317. The consent decree limited the set-asides to plaintiff class families to
between 6 percent and 12 percent of the units in HUD-assisted developments.
Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 677 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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racial goals and assisting as many plaintiff class families as possible.
The set-aside requirement did not noticeably deter developers'
applications for HUD assistance.3" 8 Many of these developments were
Section 8 projects, so the builders already planned to rent to lowincome households. Also, many of these buildings were located in
predominantly Black neighborhoods, because the set-aside requirement applied throughout the city and suburbs. So some builders
expected to have predominantly Black tenants, even without Gautreaux families. 19
However, new construction set-asides declined as a way of placing
families in the Gautreaux program because of the drastic reductions
in appropriations for federal housing programs in the 1980s.320 By the
beginning of the 1990s, very few plaintiff class families were moving
into apartments set aside for them in HUD-assisted developments
32
because construction of those projects had virtually come to a halt. '
Once again, the availability of housing limited the scale of the
Gautreaux program; but this time federal funding was the primary
constraint rather than housing owners' willingness to participate in
the program. These developers were ready and willing to accept
Gautreaux families, largely because they were already committed to
the Section 8 program, and many of them built housing in Black and
integrated neighborhoods.
The more difficult task remained securing access to housing in
predominantly white, middle class communities. That search proceeded with energy and creativity, with the persistent efforts of the

318. The eventual decline in new developments resulted from cuts in federal
funding, not lack of developer interest. Kale Williams Interview, 3/10/92, supra note
88.
319. All HUD-assisted housing had the set-aside requirement, even in Black
neighborhoods. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 677; Kale Williams Interview,
3/10/92, supra note 88.
Set-asides also applied to existing HUD-assisted housing, such as financially
troubled developments in HUD's property management inventory. In these cases,
HUD had maximum leverage for implementing set-aside requirements. Moreover,
these developments often served low-income families and were located in predominantly Black areas.
320. See supra p. 641.
321. Although the appropriations declined dramatically starting in the early
1980's, the "pipeline" continued to produce housing through those programs until
late in the decade. At that point, the Gautreaux program felt the full effects of the
cutbacks. Consequently, the program began to rely almost entirely on using Section
8 certificates and existing private housing. Kale Williams Interview, 2/24/92, supra
note 132.
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Leadership Council and, especially, the poor Black women in search
of a better life for their children.
V.

CONCLUSION

The urban rebellions of 1992 may have reawakened Americans
to the pervasive poverty and racism that continued to afflict the
country's urban centers - the persisting extraordinary inequalities in
wealth, power, and the ability to shape the conditions of life. Strategies to deal with these problems must address the needs of both
people and places. Initiatives must focus on the inner cities and the
people there, improving the life chances of both, rebuilding those
places and providing families realistic choices to stay or go, and the
ability to get to jobs - whether in the inner cities or beyond. No
single policy or program could possibly suffice. But all strategies
potentially compete with each other for political, human and financial
resources.
With these dilemmas and caveats in mind, initiatives like the
Gautreaux program can play a modest role in addressing the problems
besetting our cities. Many inner city families who were offered the
possibility of moving to outlying areas of the city and suburbs took
it. Although the private housing market in predominantly white areas,
especially in the suburbs, responded slowly and with great caution,
low-income Black families did choose to move to what for them was
a "strange land." 3 22
And, in 1991, Congress concluded that the Gautreaux program
was sufficiently promising that it ought to be replicated elsewhere on
a pilot basis.3 23 It appropriated funds for five "Moving to Opportunity" programs around the country, modeled on the Gautreaux
program.3 24 Congress based eligibility for families' participation on

322. The phrase is from Harriet Tubman, a "conductor" on the underground
railroad: "I had crossed de line of which I had so long been dreaming. I was free;
but dere was no one to welcome me to de land of freedom. I was a stranger in a
strange land." SARAH H. BRADFORD, HARRIET: THE MOSES OF HER PEOPLE 31-32
(reprint 1981) (1886).
323. The Section 8 program was the subsidy vehicle in the "Moving to Opportunity" program, just as in the Gautreaux program. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT,

FY 1993

BUDGET,

EMPOWERMENT: NEW CHOICES FOR RESIDENTS.

EXPANDING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR

324. The program envisioned HUD designation of five large metropolitan areas
to begin placing low-income families in areas outside concentrations of low-income
people in 1992. Id.

1992:589]

THE GA UTREA UX PROGRAM

their income, rather than race; but otherwise the approach tracked
the Gautreaux program closely. 25
Such programs could enable poor people, especially people of
color, to obtain decent housing in the private market, and to choose
among neighborhoods and communities throughout metropolitan areas. Families could assess for themselves the benefits and costs of
housing possibilities made available through such programs. They
could decide whether to try this approach as a possible route to
improved life chances.
These programs, with all their ideological and practical pitfalls,
provide some low-income families with choices that begin to approach
the housing and community options that middle-class, white families
take for granted. But with all of the rhetoric about market-based
strategies for solving social problems, in a society where racial and
class segregation are deeply ingrained, availability of private housing
remains the limiting factor - not the number of low-income families
interested in improving their life chances by whatever means possible.

325. The Gautreaux program focused on race, of course, because of its origins
as a remedy in a racial discrimination lawsuit. Congress' "Moving to Opportunity"
program focused on low-income households, more broadly, as the Section 8 program
did. Id.

